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Abstract
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals
generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time
to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the myopic
player transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his
actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian.
We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the long-run player’s
second-order belief. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function
of the long-run player’s past play. A novel separation effect then emerges through this
second-order belief channel, altering the traditional signaling that arises when beliefs
are public. Applications to models of leadership, reputation, and trading are examined.
1 Introduction
The general interest in signaling—i.e., information transmission through costly actions—is
reflected in its influence in virtually all subfields across economics. Despite this breadth, the
great majority of signaling games share a key commonality: the “sender” knows the belief of
the “receiver” about the sender’s type at the moment of action. While this public nature of a
receiver’s belief can be a sensible approximation in some settings, it is far less appropriate in
others, such as when imperfect private signals of behavior are at play: employers subjectively
assessing their workers’ performances (Levin, 2003); traders handling others’ orders (Yang
and Zhu, 2019); or data brokers collecting data about consumers (Bonatti and Cisternas,
2019). There, the beliefs of employers, financial intermediaries, or data brokers over variables
such as a worker’s ability, an asset’s value, or a consumer’s preferences, are private.
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Allowing for private monitoring of an informed player’s actions is an important agenda,
as it can open the way for a new set of applied-theory questions to be analyzed. How do
leaders gradually influence their followers when they do not know how their actions have been
interpreted? Can career-concerned agents benefit by not being able to observe the signals
generated by their actions when attempting to manage their reputations? How is trading
behavior affected by the possibility of hidden leakages to other traders? While clearly realistic
and relevant, these questions nonetheless present substantial challenges. First, higher-order
beliefs can arise: in most settings, the senders involved will have to form a nontrivial belief
about their receivers’ beliefs. Second, such settings can be inherently asymmetric: when
facing a sender of a fixed type, the receiver develops evolving private information in the form
of a belief. Third, most analyses will be nonstationary due to ongoing learning effects.
In this paper, we introduce a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian games of incomplete in-
formation and private monitoring in which these questions and challenges can be addressed.
A long-run player (she) and a myopic counterpart (he), both with linear-quadratic prefer-
ences, interact over a finite horizon. The long-run player has a normally distributed type.
Our key innovation is to allow the myopic player to privately observe a noisy signal of the
long-run player’s action; in turn we let the long-run player receive feedback about the my-
opic player’s inferences via an imperfect public signal of the latter’s behavior. The shocks
in both signals are additive and Brownian. Using continuous-time methods, we construct
linear Markov equilibria (LMEs) in which the players’ beliefs are the relevant states.1
Equilibrium construction and signaling. It is well known that the construction of
nontrivial equilibria in games of private monitoring can be a daunting task. In fact, to
estimate rivals’ continuation behavior under any strategy, players usually have to make an
inference about their opponents’ private histories. Not knowing what their rivals have seen,
the players will then rely on their past play, but this implies that the players’ inferences will
vary with their own private histories. Thus, (i) probability distributions over histories must
be computed, and (ii) the continuation games at off- versus on-path histories may differ.
With incomplete information, one expects this statistical inference problem to become one
of the estimation of belief states that summarize the payoff-relevant aspects of the players’
private histories—our approach offers a parsimonious treatment of this issue. The quadratic
preferences permit our players to employ strategies that are linear in their posterior beliefs’
means (henceforth, beliefs). Conjecturing such linear strategies, learning is (conditionally)
Gaussian: the myopic player’s belief is linear in the history of his private signals, and the
1The myopic “receiver” assumption is convenient for focusing exclusively on how the long-run player’s
signaling motives respond to the introduction of higher-order uncertainty, but our construction, methods
and main findings remain valid beyond this case. We discuss this and other assumptions in the conclusion.
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long-run player’s second-order belief —her belief about the myopic player’s private belief—is
linear in the histories of the public signal and her past play. The estimation of histories
described in (i) is thus simplified by the fact that these are aggregated linearly.
Critically, the long-run player’s second-order belief is also private, as her actions depend
on her type; the myopic player must therefore forecast this state. The problem of the state
space expanding is then circumvented by a key representation of the (candidate, on path)
second-order belief in terms of the long-run player’s type and the belief about it based
exclusively on the public signal (Lemma 1). Thus, performing equilibrium analysis requires
a nontrivial second-order belief that is spanned by the rest of the states along the path of
play, in a reflection of how the game’s structure changes after deviations, as noted in (ii).
With Markov states as sufficient statistics, we can write the long-run player’s best-response
problem as one of stochastic control and use dynamic programming to find LMEs.2
The long-run player controls her own second-order belief, in a generalization of the tradi-
tional control of a public belief under imperfect public monitoring. But since this state is now
an explicit function of past play, private monitoring has novel implications for signaling—our
representation result is again key. Specifically, because different types behave differently in
equilibrium, their different past behavior leads them to expect their “receivers” to hold dif-
ferent beliefs. In other words, the perception of different continuation games—as measured
by the value of the second-order belief in the representation—opens an additional channel
for separation. We refer to this as the history-inference effect on signaling. The potential
amplitude of this effect is largest when the public signal is pure noise (“no feedback”), and
thus the reliance on past play is strongest; conversely, it disappears when beliefs are public.
From a positive standpoint, the relevance of this effect depends on the plausibility of
individuals relying on their past behavior to forecast what others currently know. Crucially,
this notion strongly resonates with reality, such as when leaders reflect on their past behav-
ior when assessing organizations’ understanding of the leadership’s long-term goals, when
politicians gauge their reputations, or when traders estimate how much of their private in-
formation has been learned by others. We are not aware of an existing framework where the
signaling implications of this natural use of past behavior can be studied. Our approach,
which ultimately exploits the use of ordinary differential equations (ODEs), offers a venue.
Applications. To leverage the flexibility of the model, we examine one instance of our
baseline specification and two based on extensions of it. Our aim is to show how the precisions
of the signals involved shape outcomes via the extent of higher-order uncertainty created.
In our leading application (Section 2), we examine the history-inference effect in a coordi-
2The presence of this public belief creates signal-jamming motives for the long-run player.
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nation game inspired by the linear-quadratic team theory of Marschak and Radner (1972)—
this framework, along with its extensions allowing for misaligned preferences, has become
the main laboratory for studying the impact of information structures on organizations.
In the setting examined, the performance of a team composed of a leader and a follower
increases with the proximity of its members’ actions and of the leader’s action to the state
of the world. The leader shares the team’s payoffs, while the follower attempts to match
the leader’s action at all times. Recognizing the prevalence of information frictions within
organizations, we assume that, while the leader knows the state of the world, the follower’s
learning about it is only gradual and private, albeit influenced by the leader’s behavior. In
this context, the absence of feedback, via the history-inference effect it creates, can lead to
more information being transmitted relative to the case in which the follower’s belief is public.
However, the team’s performance is lower. Thus, organizations with a better understanding
of the economic environment can underperform their less informed counterparts.
Uncertainty about others’ beliefs is also natural in reputational settings. In Section 5.1,
we examine a model of horizontal reputation based on an extension that allows for terminal
payoffs: the long-run player suffers a terminal quadratic loss that increases in the distance
between the myopic player’s belief and the type’s prior (e.g., a politician facing reelection
who desires a reputation for neutrality). In such a context, we show that not directly
observing her reputation can benefit the long-run player, despite the negative direct effect of
the increased uncertainty over her concave objective. Indeed, since higher types take higher
actions due to their higher biases, those types must offset higher beliefs to appear unbiased;
the history-inference effect then reduces the informativeness of the long-run player’s action,
making beliefs less sensitive to new information, a strategic effect that can dominate.
Finally, in Section 5.2, we exploit the presence of the public belief state in a linear trading
model in which an informed trader faces both a myopic trader who privately monitors her
and a competitive market maker who only observes the public total order flow. In this
context, we show that there is no linear Markov equilibrium for any degree of noise of the
private signal. Intuitively, the myopic player introduces momentum into the price, as the
information he obtains is now distributed to the market maker through all future order flows.
This causes prices to move against the insider and creates urgency—with an infinite number
of opportunities to trade, the insider trades away all information in the first instant.
Existence of LME and technical contribution. The bulk of our analysis unfolds in
Sections 3 and 4, where we introduce the general model and lay out the methodological
framework. A distinctive feature there is that the environment is asymmetric, both in terms
of the players’ preferences and their private information (a fixed state versus a changing
one). In particular, the players can signal at substantially different rates, which is in stark
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contrast to the existing literature on symmetric multisided learning. With different rates of
learning, however, the equilibrium analysis can become severely complicated.
Specifically, our belief states depend on both the myopic player’s posterior variance,
which determines the sensitivity of the myopic player’s belief, and the weight attached to
the long-run player’s type in the representation result, which shapes the history-inference
effect and is linked to the long-run player’s learning. Both functions are deterministic due to
the Gaussian structure. Using dynamic programming, one can then show that the problem
of the existence of an LME reduces to a boundary value problem (BVP) including ODEs for
the two aforementioned functions of time and for the weights in the long-run player’s linear
Markov strategy. The two learning ODEs endow the BVP with exogenous initial conditions,
while the rest carry terminal conditions arising from myopic play at the end of the game.
With multiple ODEs in both directions, establishing the existence of a solution to such
a BVP is a challenging “shooting” problem: not only must solutions to all individual ODEs
exist, but they must land at specific (potentially endogenous) values. To address this com-
plexity, we distinguish between two types of environments. In a private-value setting, the
myopic player’s best response is only a function of his expectation of the long-run player’s
action, i.e., it does not depend directly on his expectation of the type. In this context, there
is enough (strategic) symmetry that a one-to-one mapping emerges between the solutions
to the learning ODEs, which renders the shooting problem unidimensional (Lemma 4). Via
traditional continuity arguments, we can guarantee the existence of an LME in the leadership
model of Section 2 when the public signal is of intermediate quality, for a horizon length
that is decreasing in the prior variance of the state of the world (Theorem 1).
In common-value settings, the multidimensionality issue must be confronted. Building on
the literature on BVPs with intertemporal linear constraints (Keller, 1968), we can establish
the existence of LME for our BVP that carries intratemporal nonlinear (terminal) constraints.
Specifically, the multidimensional shooting problem can be formulated as one of finding a
fixed point for a suitable function derived from the BVP, a problem that we tackle for a
variation of the leadership model in which the follower directly cares about the state of the
world (Theorem 2). Critically, this approach is general: we show how to apply it to the whole
class of games under study, and more generally, it offers a promising venue for examining
behavior in other settings exhibiting incomplete information and asymmetries.
Related Literature. A long literature on multisided private monitoring has developed in
repeated games with complete information, where the issue of inferences of private histories
has been handled very differently relative to us. Closest in spirit is Phelan and Skrzypacz
(2012), where such inferences are coarsened into beliefs over a finite set of states; instead,
our players’ states take infinitely many values and completely determine their beliefs about
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the other player’s state. Other approaches include Mailath and Morris (2002), examining
equilibria that condition on finite histories when monitoring is nearly public, and Ely and
Va¨lima¨ki (2002), where mixed-strategy equilibria render such inferences irrelevant. Relative
to this literature, we focus on one-sided private monitoring but add private information at the
outset to construct and quantify natural, yet nontrivial, belief-dependent Markov equilibria.
Regarding signaling models, in traditional static (i.e., sequential-move, one-shot) noisy
signaling games (e.g., Matthews and Mirman, 1983; Carlsson and Dasgupta, 1997), the signal
realization is trivially hidden from the sender at the moment of action, but the common prior
makes the receiver’s belief known at the same time. In dynamic environments, the receiver’s
belief is public in settings with observable actions and an exogenous, public stochastic process
(e.g., Daley and Green, 2012; Gryglewicz and Kolb, 2019; Kolb, 2019) or when there is
imperfect public monitoring, such as in Heinsalu (2018) and Dilme´ (2019). By contrast, our
assumptions on payoffs and signal structure make all players’ beliefs private.
Private beliefs arise in Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Bonatti et al. (2017), where
all the players have fixed private information and there is an imperfect public signal; a rep-
resentation result for first-order beliefs eliminates the need for higher-order beliefs. Bonatti
and Cisternas (2019) in turn examine two-sided signaling when firms privately observe a
summary of a consumer’s past behavior to price discriminate; however, via the prices they
set, firms perfectly reveal their information to the consumer. Finally, private beliefs can also
result from an exogenous private signal of the sender’s type, as in Feltovich et al. (2002).
Turning to our applications, adaptation-coordination tradeoffs are a key element in recent
analyses of organizations: in static, linear-quadratic, settings, see Dessein and Santos (2006)
and Rantakari (2008) for questions of specialization and governance, respectively; our focus
is instead on the dynamics of information transmission with private signals of behavior.
Bouvard and Le´vy (2019) examine a model of horizontal reputation with quadratic payoffs
and symmetric uncertainty; beliefs are public in the linear Markov equilibrium constructed.
Lastly, Yang and Zhu (2019) study a two-period model in which a trader faces, in the second
period, a “backrunner” who has observed a private signal of the former’s first-period trade;
there, the feedback element is absent, and so is the need for a belief representation like ours.
To conclude, this paper contributes to a growing literature using continuous-time methods
to analyze dynamic incentives. Sannikov (2007) examines two-player games of imperfect
public monitoring; Faingold and Sannikov (2011) reputation effects with behavioral types;
Cisternas (2018) games of ex ante symmetric incomplete information; and Bergemann and
Strack (2015) revenue maximization with privately informed buyers. Our representation
result and derivation of belief states, the distinction between private and common-value
settings, and the question of existence of equilibria make these methods virtually necessary.
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2 Application: Coordinated Adaptation
A team consisting of a leader (she) and a follower (he) operates over a finite horizon [0, T ].
The environment is parametrized by a state of the world θ that is normally distributed with
mean µ ∈ R and variance γo > 0. Letting at ∈ R and aˆt ∈ R denote the leader’s action and
follower’s action at time t ∈ [0, T ], respectively, the team’s performance is given by
ˆ T
0
e−rt{−(at − θ)2 − (at − aˆt)2}dt, (1)
where r ≥ 0 is a discount rate. The leader knows the state of the world at the outset, while
the follower only knows the prior distribution (and this is common knowledge).
We assume that the leader’s preferences coincide with the team’s payoffs. In turn, the
follower is myopic, always attempting to match the leader’s action, i.e., attempting to mini-
mize his expectation of (at − aˆt)2 at all times. To solve this prediction problem, this player
relies solely on a private signal of the leader’s action that is distorted by Brownian noise:
dYt = atdt+ σY dZ
Y
t .
Intuitively, as the leader signals—e.g., as she takes actions intended to drive the organi-
zation in her desired direction—observing Y allows the follower to gradually adjust towards
taking the “right” action (in this case, θ). But since Y is private to the follower, the leader
loses track of the follower’s belief in the process. Attempting to adapt the organization to
new economic conditions then creates two-sided uncertainty: the organization’s members do
not know the long-term goals behind the leadership’s actions, and the leadership does not
know the organization’s understanding of what should be done at all instants of time.
We are motivated by two elements that are critical to the performance of organizations.
1. Efficient adaptation. Adjusting to the external economic environment is a key problem
for organizations, requiring substantial coordination of multiple functions (Williamson,
1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992), which implies that (i) misaligned incentives and (ii)
information frictions are key threats. The adaptation and coordination concerns are
captured by −(at− θ)2 and −(at− aˆt)2, respectively; in turn, the follower’s preferences
partially align the players’ objectives to concentrate on information frictions.3
2. Bounded rationality. The barriers that people face in solving problems and processing
information are at the core of every organization (Simon, 1957). As Williamson (1996)
further remarks, “failures of coordination can arise because autonomous parties read
3Our general analysis allows for misalignments in the players’ flow payoffs (see Section 4.3).
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and react to signals differently, even though their purpose is to achieve a timely and
compatible response” (p. 102). In our setup, Y is noisy, and its noise is idiosyncratic
to the follower: examples include Y being linked to a cognitive process of the follower,
or to a chain of imperfect transmissions that hides the final realization from the leader.
The leader’s knowledge of the state of the world is therefore understood as expertise
relevant to the current economic conditions; the transmission of this knowledge is then
linked to behavior, but the transfer is slow and imperfect. In this regard, our choice to shut
down communication is essentially a dimensionality constraint intended to reflect situations
in which the knowledge involved is substantially richer than the code available.4
We now study two information structures for the leader: in the perfect-feedback case, the
leader observes the follower’s action; in the no-feedback case, she observes nothing. That is,
we keep the difficulty in transferring knowledge as given (the signal Y is fixed), and we vary
the quality of the information fed to the leader (which is the more likely choice variable).
These are limit instances of a model we explore Sections 3 and 4 under general preferences.
Perfect feedback (“public”) case. If the leader perfectly observes the follower’s action
she can potentially infer the follower’s belief, in which case the latter belief becomes public.
In a linear Markov equilibrium (LME), the leader chooses actions that are linear both in
her type θ and in the follower’s (commonly known) belief Mˆt := Eˆt[θ], where Eˆt[·] denotes
the follower’s expectation operator; in turn, the follower’s action is his best prediction of
the leader’s action, and hence it is linear in Mˆt exclusively.
5 For consistency throughout the
paper, we write β3t for the weight on the type in the leader’s strategy at t ∈ [0, T ].
Proposition 1 (LME—Public Case). For all r ≥ 0 and T > 0:
(i) Existence of LME: There exists a unique LME. In this equilibrium, at = β3tθ + (1 −
β3t)Mˆt and aˆt = Eˆt[at] = Mˆt, where (β3t)t∈[0,T ] is deterministic.
(ii) Signaling and learning: β3t ∈ (1/2, 1) for t < T , β3T = 1/2, and β3 is strictly decreas-
ing. Also, γt := Eˆt[(θ − Mˆt)2] evolves according to γ˙t = −
(
γtβ3t
σY
)2
.
In the LME, the leader reduces her degree of adaptation below the full-information so-
lution a ≡ θ to coordinate with the follower—we refer to the weight β3 on the type as the
4These features resonate with the notion of tacit knowledge—“know-how” that is difficult to codify and
transfer. Recognized as a key input to production, Garicano (2000) examines its implications on hierarchies,
while Grant (1996) argues that this knowledge is “only being observed through its application” and Nonaka
(1991) that it is “rooted in action and in an individual’s commitment to a specific context.”
5This notion of LME is perfect when Y is public, but only Nash when Y is private but the follower’s
action is observed—our choice of exposition (observed actions as opposed to a public Y ) stems from the form
of our general model. We keep the abbreviation later on despite its subsequent “perfection” property.
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signaling coefficient. This coefficient shapes the follower’s learning captured by the posterior
variance γt, and it remains above 1/2—the value in the static equilibrium (
1
2
θ + 1
2
Mˆ, Mˆ)—
except at the end of the game. Indeed, by more aggressively signaling her know-how, the
leader can steer the follower’s behavior toward the first-best action faster, effectively invest-
ing in the follower’s adaptation. This incentive falls deterministically (i.e., β3t is decreasing)
because of both horizon and learning effects—there is less time remaining to enjoy those
benefits, and steering behavior becomes more difficult as information accumulates.6
No-feedback case. Suppose now that the leader ceases to receive any information about
the follower: how does she forecast Mˆ , and how are signaling and learning affected?
To gain intuition, let us first elaborate on the form of the follower’s belief when it is
public. Upon conjecturing a linear Markov strategy by the leader, the follower’s learning has
a Gaussian structure, and so Mˆ is a linear function of the history Y t := (Ys : 0 ≤ s < t):
namely, there are deterministic A1(·) and A2(·, ·) such that
Mˆt = A1(t) +
ˆ t
0
A2(t, s)dYs, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2)
The leader’s forecast of Mˆ is trivially given by the same formula, as observing aˆ (or Y )
reveals the follower’s belief. That is, the leader forecasts by output : Y , which reflects the
consequences of her actions from the follower’s perspective, fully determines her inferences.
In the absence of feedback, the signal Y is not available, making the leader’s forecasting
problem nontrivial. However, to the extent that Mˆ is as above (for potentially different A1
and A2), the leader can take an expectation in (2) to obtain her second-order belief
Mt = A1(t) +
ˆ t
0
A2(t, s)asds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3)
Crucially, this belief now is a function of the leader’s past actions, so the leader forecasts by
input : absent any information, the leader must reflect on her past behavior to assess how
much knowledge has been transferred. As natural as it seems, however, observe that past play
was completely irrelevant with perfect feedback: higher (lower) past actions only indicated
that more negative (positive) shocks thwarted the leader’s efforts, which is immaterial for
future decision-making. The importance of forecasting by input versus output depends on
the setting, but many situations will entail both; our general model captures this feature.
It is clear from (2) and (3) that a common element in these two extreme information
structures studied is that, in both, future beliefs respond to different continuation strategies
6In fact, dMˆtdat =
γtβ3t
σ2Y
, so the sensitivity of the follower’s belief falls with lower values of γ.
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linearly; through this forward-looking exercise, the leader determines her best response to
the follower’s strategy. However, the follower’s behavior will depend on his assessment of the
informational content behind the leader’s actions, and this is a backward-looking exercise:
how do different types behave at their respective histories? Whether beliefs are a function
of commonly observed versus private information then introduces important differences.
Abusing notation, let us now consider a linear strategy for the leader of the form
at = β0tµ+ β1tMt + β3tθ, (4)
with the coefficients again being deterministic. It is evident that M is generically private to
the leader under (4), as her actions carry her type—how will the follower coordinate then?
Inspection of (3) and (4), however, suggests a linear relationship between M and θ. Suppose
then that the follower conjectures that, on path, (Mt)t∈[0,T ] satisfies the representation
Mt =
(
1− γt
γo
)
θ +
γt
γo
µ, (5)
where (γt)t∈[0,T ] again denotes the follower’s posterior variance but now under (4)–(5). As a
proof of concept, note that setting γ0 = γ
o in (5) leads to M0 = µ = Mˆ0, consistent with the
common prior at time zero; conversely, if enough signaling has occurred, the leader thinks
that the follower must have learned the state: γt ≈ 0 leads to Mt ≈ θ in the same formula.
The representation (5) is key. First, it encodes how private monitoring alters the extent
of information transmission. In fact, the new signaling coefficient—denoted α—is obtained
as the total weight on θ when inserting (5) into the leader’s strategy (4), which yields
α := β3 + β1χ, where χ := 1− γ
γo
.
We refer to the correction term β1χ stemming from (5) as the history-inference effect on
signaling. Indeed, since the leader forecasts by input, the follower needs to infer the leader’s
private histories to extract the correct informational content from Y . From his perspective,
how differently would a leader of a marginally higher type behave given a history Y t? With
perfect feedback, the overall effect is β3, as all types agree on the value that Mˆ takes (i.e.,
they pool along the belief dimension); this is not the case when there is no feedback, as their
differing past actions also lead them to perceive different continuation games via M .
Second, the representation prevents the state space from growing: via (5), the follower’s
belief about M (i.e., a third-order belief) is a function of Mˆ , and so Et[Eˆt[Mt]] is a function of
Mt, and so forth. The linear-quadratic-Gaussian structure then ensures that (θ,M, µ, t), with
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M as in (3), summarizes all that is payoff-relevant for the leader after all private histories.7
Proposition 2 (LME—No-Feedback Case). For all r ≥ 0 and T > 0:
(i) Existence: There exists an LME. In any such equilibrium, β0 +β1 +β3 = 1; β3t > 1/2,
t ∈ [0, T ); β3T = 1/2; and β1 > 0 over [0, T ].
(ii) Signaling and learning: α := β3 +β1χ, where χ = 1− γt/γo, satisfies α > 1/2; αT → 1
as T → ∞; and α′t ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ), with strict inequality if and only if r > 0. Also,
γt := Eˆt[(θ − Mˆ)2] evolves as γ˙t = −
(
αtγt
σY
)2
.
From part (ii) we see that private monitoring overturns strictly decreasing signaling effects
expected to arise under the traditional logic of public beliefs: α is non-decreasing.
β3 Public
β3 NF
α NF
0 2 4 6 8 10
t
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0 2 4 6 8 10
t
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
β3 Publicβ3 NFα NF
Figure 1: Left r = 0; Right: r = 1. Other parameter values: γo = 1, σY = 1.5, T = 10.
Comparison. Figure 1 plots the signaling coefficients in each LME. In the no-feedback
case, β3 is decreasing, so a nondecreasing α implies that the history-inference effect increases
over time. Indeed, because higher types take higher actions holding everything else fixed,
they will expect their followers to have higher beliefs: this effect then grows—reflected in
M attaching an increasing weight χ to θ in (5)—as past play acquires more relevance for
predicting the continuation game as time progresses. With a positive coordination motive
(β1 > 0) that also strengthens with time, higher types gradually take even higher actions via
this second-order belief channel, enhancing the informational content of the leader’s action.
Being forced to rely on her past actions to forecast the follower’s understanding essentially
imposes discipline on the leader: she does not cater to the follower’s belief as she would in
the public case. In turn, this suggests that more knowledge is transferred to the follower.
To assess the validity of this conjecture, we take advantage of the model’s analytic solutions
in the patient (r = 0) and myopic (r = ∞) cases. Let γPub and γNF denote the follower’s
posterior variance in the public and no-feedback cases, respectively.
7To conjecture the outcome of the game (i.e., (5)), and hence to be able to interpret signals correctly,
our players must generically anticipate how play unfolds when (5) fails. Lemma A.2 in the Appendix proves
that (5) holds. The method for showing existence is part of a broader approach discussed in Section 4.3.
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Proposition 3 (Total learning). (i) If r = 0, βPub30 > α0 and γ
Pub
T > γ
NF
T , all T > 0; (ii)
Given T > 0 and δ ∈ (0, T ), γPubt > γNFt for t ∈ [T − δ, T ] if r is large enough.
Consequently, when the leader is either patient or very impatient, in the no-feedback case
the follower always has learned more by the end of the interaction. To show that this result
is nontrivial, part (i) states that in the beginning, a patient leader always signals less aggres-
sively in the no-feedback case—this is due to the anticipation of the history-inference effect
at play later. Conversely, when the leader is myopic, the previous inter-temporal substitution
effect disappears, so the only difference between the signaling coefficients in the no-feedback
and public cases is the history-inference effect that arises in the former. As argued previously,
this effect is always positive; part (ii) then follows by uniform convergence.8
We conclude with a discussion on how payoffs and information transmission connect:
Proposition 4 (Team’s payoff). (i) If r = 0, the team’s ex ante payoff is larger in the public
case; (ii) ∀r ≥ 0, ex ante undiscounted coordination costs equal σ2Y log
(
γo
γT
)
in each case.
The direct effect of shutting down the feedback channel is increased coordination costs:
holding everything else fixed, the leader is now uncertain about a concave payoff. To un-
derstand the strategic effect, part (ii) is key: in both cases, the extent of the follower’s
learning is a measure of total coordination costs. Consider the perfect-feedback case: if the
leader chooses an action that the follower can match, no coordination costs are created, but
this necessarily implies that the leader is neglecting her type. Consequently, the leadership
transmits its knowledge only when it introduces changes to which the organization does not
perfectly know how to respond, generating transient miscoordination in the process.
From this perspective, private monitoring exacerbates such costs by making the follower’s
actions more volatile in response to more informative, yet stable, behavior by the leader; in
particular, the team is worse off in the no-feedback case when the leader is patient (part (i)).
This setting of action-based information transmission then reveals that an organization’s
better understanding of its leadership’s goals need not be indicative of better past, or even
future, performance: it can be reflective of the organization’s painful struggle to coordinate.9
The next sections develop a framework for general quadratic preferences and partially in-
formative public feedback channels. This generality is important not only for the breadth of
applications that can be explored but also because information channels often have interme-
diate quality. For organizations in particular, the value of the analysis is clear: improvements
8The ranking of terminal learning appears to hold for all r > 0. See Figure 1 in the online appendix.
9Marschak (1955) stresses the importance of incorporating action-based information transmission in the
analysis of organizations: “A realistic theory of teams would be dynamic. It takes time to process and pass
messages along a chain of members; and messages must include not only information on external variables,
but also information on what has been done [emphasis added] by other members in the team” (p. 137). See
Hermalin (1998) for a theory of leadership featuring noiseless signaling, albeit in a static setting.
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in quality can sometimes be prohibitively costly, and even when partial improvements are
feasible, cost-benefit analyses require assessing payoffs under varying levels of uncertainty.
3 General Model
We consider two-player, linear-quadratic-Gaussian games with private information and pri-
vate monitoring. Extensions of the baseline setup are presented in Section 5 via applications.
Players, Actions and Payoffs. A forward-looking long-run player (she) and a myopic
counterpart (he) interact in a repeated game that is played continuously over a time interval
[0, T ], T <∞. At each instant t ∈ [0, T ], the long-run player chooses an action at, while the
myopic player chooses aˆt, both taking values over the real line. If at any instant the profile
of actions chosen is (a, aˆ), the long-run player’s and myopic player’s flow payoffs are
U(a, aˆ, θ) and Uˆ(a, aˆ, θ), (6)
respectively, where U and Uˆ are quadratic functions. In (6), θ denotes a normally distributed
random variable with mean µ ∈ R and variance γo > 0. The long-run player discounts the
future at a rate r > 0, while the myopic player cares only about his flow payoff at all times.
To state our main assumptions on the functions U and Uˆ , we introduce the scalars
uxy :=
∂2U/∂x∂y
|∂2U/∂a2| and uˆxy :=
∂2Uˆ/∂x∂y
|∂2Uˆ/∂aˆ2| , for x, y ∈ {a, aˆ, θ}.
Indeed, if the players’ flow payoffs are concave in their respective actions, best responses will
exhibit denominators like the above, allowing us to state our conditions in normalized form:
Assumption 1. Flow payoffs satisfy (i) uaa = uˆaˆaˆ = −1 (strict concavity); (ii) uaθ(uaθ +
uaaˆuˆaˆθ) > 0 (nontrivial signaling); (iii) |uˆaˆθ| + |uˆaaˆ| 6= 0 and |uaaˆ| + |uaˆaˆ| 6= 0 (second-order
inferences); and (iv) uaaˆuˆaaˆ < 1 (myopic best-replies intersect).
Our first requirement is that θ be strategically relevant for the long-run player (i.e.,
uaθ 6= 0), which is implied by (ii). Part (iii) then invokes the use of higher-order inferences.
Specifically, the first condition states that the myopic player’s first-order belief influences his
behavior, either because he cares about θ directly (uˆaˆθ term) or indirectly via the long-run
player’s action (uˆaaˆ term); in turn, the second condition forces the long-run player to forecast
the myopic player’s belief, due to either an interaction term (uaaˆ) or a nonlinear effect (uaˆaˆ).
(Clearly, (iii) is a choice to focus on the most interesting cases rather than a limitation.)
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The remaining conditions are used to find equilibria in linear strategies. The concavity
of the players’ objectives with respect to their own actions (part (i)) gives rise to linear best
responses. Coupled with (iv), the static game of two-sided private information that arises
at the end of the interaction will admit a Nash equilibrium; part (ii) then ensures that this
equilibrium entails type dependence. We will revisit these assumptions in Section 4.
Information. The long-run player observes the value of θ before play begins, while the
myopic player only knows its distribution θ ∼ N (µ, γo) (and this is common knowledge).
There are also two signals with full support due to the presence of Brownian noise:
dXt = aˆtdt+ σXdZ
X
t and dYt = atdt+ σY dZ
Y
t , (7)
where ZX and ZY are orthogonal and the volatility parameters σY and σX strictly positive.
Our key departure from existing analyses is to make Y—which carries information about
the long-run player’s actions—privately observed by the myopic player; instead, the signal
X carrying the latter player’s action remains public. This mixed private-public information
structure is important for our construction, but it is also natural for analyzing sender-receiver
games: it makes the departure minimal while still economically relevant for applications.
In what follows, we let Et[·] denote the long-run player’s conditional expectation operator,
which can condition on the histories (θ, as, Xs : 0 ≤ s ≤ t) and on her conjecture of the
myopic player’s play. Similarly, Eˆt[·] denotes the myopic player’s analog, which conditions
on (aˆs, Xs, Ys : 0 ≤ s ≤ t) and on his belief about the long-run player’s strategy, t ≥ 0.10
Strategies and Equilibrium Concept. With full-support monitoring, the only off-path
histories for each player are those in which that player herself/himself has deviated. Thus, we
use the Nash equilibrium concept for defining the equilibrium of the game, as imposing full
sequential rationality places no additional restrictions on the set of equilibrium outcomes.
From this perspective, an admissible strategy for the long-run player is any square-
integrable real-valued process (at)t∈[0,T ] that is progressively measurable with respect to
the filtration generated by (θ,X). The analogous notion for the myopic player involves the
identical integrability condition, but the measurability restriction is with respect to (X, Y ).11
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium.). An admissible pair (at, aˆt)t≥0 is a Nash equilibrium if:
(i) the process (at)t∈[0,T ] maximizes E0
[´ T
0
e−rtU(at, aˆt, θ)dt
]
; and (ii) for each t ∈ [0, T ], aˆt
maximizes Eˆt[Uˆ(at, aˆt, θ)] when (aˆs)s<t has been followed.
10In particular, flow payoffs do not convey any additional information to the players (i.e., payoffs accrue
after time T , or they can be written in terms of the actions and signals observed by each player).
11Square integrability is in the sense of the time-zero expectations of
´ T
0
a2tdt and
´ T
0
aˆ2tdt being finite.
This ensures that a strong solution to (7) exists and thus that the outcome of the game is well defined.
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In the next section, we characterize Nash equilibria supported by strategies that are fully
sequentially rational, thereby specifying behavior after deviations. The equilibria studied
generalize that of Section 2 for the no-feedback case σX =∞ to the whole range 0 < σX ≤ ∞.
Remark 1 (Extensions). Our methods can accommodate various extensions, including: (i)
a terminal payoff for the long-run player Ψ(aˆT ), where Ψ is quadratic; and (ii) the drift of X
in (7) taking the form aˆt + νat, where ν ∈ [0, 1] is a scalar. See Section 5.1 for a reputation
model featuring (i) and Section 5.2 for an insider trading model featuring (ii) (that also
accommodates ∂2U/∂a2 = 0, as is traditional in that literature).
4 Equilibrium Analysis: Linear Markov Equilibria
We construct linear Markov (perfect) equilibria using the players’ beliefs as the relevant
states. Indeed, the quadratic payoffs and linear signals open the possibility for quadratic
value functions that are supported by strategies that are linear in some state variables. For
this to work, however, the states themselves must be linear in the signals available. With a
Gaussian information structure, it is then natural to appeal to belief-based states.
The appeal of such equilibria is twofold. First, the Markov restriction captures that
behavior depends only on the aspects of the histories that the players perceive to be payoff-
relevant. Second, in equilibrium, the players’ actions are linear in the signals observed, which
generalizes traditional linear equilibria widely employed in static applied-theory work.
4.1 Belief States and Representation Lemma
Specifically, we characterize equilibria in which, after their corresponding (on- or off-path)
private histories, the long-run player and the myopic counterpart play according to
at = β0t + β1tMt + β2tLt + β3tθ (8)
aˆt = δ0t + δ1tMˆt + δ2tLt. (9)
Here, Mˆt := Eˆt[θ] is the myopic player’s first-order belief, Mt := Et[Mˆt] the long-run player’s
second-order counterpart, and Lt := E[θ|FXt ] is the belief about θ using the public informa-
tion exclusively ; the coefficients βit and δjt, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and j = 0, 1, 2, are deterministic.
Intuitively, because the long-run player conditions her actions on her type ((ii) in Assump-
tion 1), the myopic player’s belief (Mˆt)[0,T ] is a relevant state (first part in (iii), Assumption
1). However, this implies that the long-run player must forecast the myopic player’s belief
to determine her best response (second part in (iii), Assumption 1), which makes (Mt)t∈[0,T ]
payoff-relevant. The appearance of Lt is in turn linked to the nature of Mt, as follows.
15
As is traditional, the long-run player will use X to forecast Mˆ since this signal carries the
myopic player’s action. The novelty is that, due to the private monitoring, she will also use
the history of her past actions in this forecasting exercise. Intuitively, as long as the public
signal is imperfect (i.e., σX > 0), the long-run player does not perfectly know the inferences
made by the myopic player, so higher action profiles become statistically informative of
higher private observations by the myopic player, and vice versa. The explicit dependence of
the long-run player’s second-order belief M on her past actions—as occurred in (3)—makes
this state a private one even in equilibrium, as those actions depend on her actual type. The
myopic player is then forced to make an inference about this belief (and so forth).
Along the path of play of any pure strategy, however, the outcome of the game should
depend only on (θ,X, Y ). In particular, M must be a function of the tuple (θ,X), which is
the long-run player’s only source of information. The Gaussian structure then suggests the
existence of process (Lt)t∈[0,T ] depending only on the public information, and a deterministic
function χ, such that, under the linear profile (8)–(9) carrying this public process,
Mt = χtθ + (1− χt)Lt. (10)
The representation (10) is at the core of our analysis. First, if true, it shows that the
“beliefs about beliefs” problem is manageable: as the myopic player uses (10) to forecast
M , all higher-order expectations can be written in terms of the aforementioned belief states.
(Clearly, in this third-order inference step by the myopic player, L becomes payoff-relevant.)
Second, the representation encodes the separation that occurs via the second-order belief
channel. Indeed, (10) captures how, under linear strategies, the long-run player balances
her past play (χθ term) and the public signal ((1− χ)L term) when forecasting the myopic
player’s belief. Inserting (10) into the long-run player’s strategy (8) yields the action process
at = β0t︸︷︷︸
=:α0t
+ (β2t + β1t(1− χt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:α2t
Lt + (β3t + β1tχt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:α3t
θ, (11)
from which the signaling coefficient is α3t := β3t + β1tχt. The term β1χt encodes the afore-
mentioned history-inference effect : different types take different actions in equilibrium partly
because their differing past actions have lead them to hold different beliefs today.
Our approach for characterizing (10) is constructive. To state the formal result, we omit
the hat symbol for convenience and denote the myopic player’s posterior variance simply by
γt := Eˆt[(θ − Mˆt)2].
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Lemma 1 (Second-order belief representation). Suppose that (X, Y ) is driven by (8)–(9)
and the myopic player believes that (10), with (Lt)t∈[0,T ] a process that depends only on the
public information, holds. Then (10) holds at all times (path-by-path of X), if and only if
γ˙t = −γ
2
t (β3t + β1tχt)
2
σ2Y
, γ0 = γ
o, (12)
χ˙t =
γt(β3t + β1tχt)
2(1− χt)
σ2Y
− γtχ
2
t δ
2
1t
σ2X
, χ0 = 0, (13)
dLt = (l0t + l1tLt)dt+BtdXt, L0 = µ, (14)
with (l0t, l1t, Bt) given in (B.7) deterministic. Also, Lt = E[θ|FXt ] and γtχt = Et[(Mt−Mˆt)2].
In light of the lemma, the representation (10) reads Mt =
Vart
V̂art
θ +
(
1− Vart
V̂art
)
E[θ|FXt ],
where we have used the notation V̂art := Eˆt[(θ−Mˆt)2] and Vart := Et[(Mt−Mˆt)2], the latter
measuring the long-run player’s uncertainty about Mˆ . Indeed, in forecasting Mˆ , the only
informational advantage that the long-run player has relative to an outsider who observes
X exclusively is that she knows what actions she has taken, and such actions carry her
type. Under linear strategies, learning is Gaussian, so (i) Mt is a linear combination of θ
and E[Mˆt|FXt ], and (ii) the weights are deterministic; the representation then follows from
E[Mˆt|FXt ] = E[θ|FXt ]. Observe also that the linearity of E[θ|FXt ] in the history (Xs : 0 ≤
s < t) can be deduced from the linearity of (14) both in L and in the increments of X.12
The χ-ODE (13) quantifies the dynamics of the relevance of past behavior in the previous
forecasting exercise. Indeed, by the common prior, Var0 = 0 and E[θ|FX0 ] = µ; thus, M0 = µ
in the display above, and so the χ-ODE must start at zero. As signaling progresses, however,
the long-run player loses track of Mˆ (i.e., Vart > 0), forcing her to rely on her past behavior:
this is captured in χ˙ > 0 as soon as α3 > 0 in (13). The positivity of χ then simply reflects
that the long-run player expects Mˆ to gradually incorporate her type via this channel.
The relative importance of past play will naturally depend on the quality of the public
information. Consider the last term γtχ
2
t δ
2
1t/σ
2
X in (13). If σX = ∞ or δ1 ≡ 0, the public
signal is uninformative: indeed, Lt = L0 = µ and χt = 1 − γt/γo in both cases, as in the
no-feedback analysis of Section 2.13 Apart from these cases, the public information is always
useful. In particular, as δ21/σ
2
X grows, more downward pressure is exerted on the growth of χ,
reflecting a weaker dependence on past play as the quality of X improves, all else being equal;
in the limit, χ ≡ 0 and L → Mˆ , and so M → Mˆ (i.e., the environment becomes public).
The no-feedback case then maximizes the potential amplitude of the history-inference effect.
12The resulting expression for L holds irrespective of the past private histories of the players: this is
because deviations are hidden and hence each player thinks the counterparty has constructed L using (14).
13In (13), δ1/σX ≡ 0 leads to the χ-ODE in the no-feedback case (see the proof of Lemma A.2).
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Our subsequent analysis takes the system of ODEs for (γ, χ) as an input, so we require
(12)–(13) to have a unique solution to ensure that the ODE-characterization is valid. Note
that the weight on Mˆ in the myopic player’s best reply is given by uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆa[β3t + β1tχt].
Lemma 2 (Learning ODEs). Suppose (β1, β3) is continuous and δ1t = uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆa[β3t +β1tχt].
Then (12)–(13) has a unique solution and 0 < γt ≤ γo and 0 ≤ χt < 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. If,
moreover, β30 6= 0, then these inequalities are strict over (0, T ].
The filtering equations are valid under weak integrability conditions on the coefficients in
(8)–(9), from which γt = Eˆt[(θ − Mˆt)2] and χt = Vart/V̂art = Et[(Mt − Mˆt)2]/γt must solve
the system; a mild strengthening of the conditions ensures that no other solutions exist, and
if β30 6= 0 (a property our equilibria satisfy), some information indeed gets transmitted.
Our derivation of the representation (10) exploits the tractability of the Gaussian filtering
under linear strategies. Due to the full-support monitoring, the myopic player expects at =
α0t + α2tLt + α3tθ defined in (11), and L is public. The myopic player’s learning problem
of filtering θ from Y is thus (conditionally) Gaussian, so his belief is characterized by a
stochastic mean (Mˆt)t∈[0,T ] and the deterministic variance (γt)t∈[0,T ]. But the linearity of the
signal structure renders the pair (Mˆ,X) (conditionally) Gaussian too. The long-run player’s
filtering then yields a second mean-variance pair, with Mt now an explicit linear function of
her past actions. One can insert the linear strategy (8) into Mt to pin down (χ, L).
The representation (10) then relies on the long-run player following the linear strategy
(8). In particular, that M is spanned by θ and L is no longer true after deviations, and such
deviations are needed to evaluate the candidacy of (8) as an LME. This brings us to the
third property behind (10): it captures a divergence in the game’s structure at on- versus
off-path histories, a well known feature of games with private monitoring. The next result
introduces the law of motion of M and L for an arbitrary strategy of the long-run player.
Lemma 3 (Controlled dynamics). Suppose that the myopic player follows (9) and believes
that (8) and (10) hold. Then, if the long-run player follows (a′t)t∈[0,T ], from her perspective
dMt =
γtα3t
σ2Y
(a′t − [α0t + α2tLt + α3tMt])dt+
χtγtδ1t
σX
dZt (15)
dLt =
χtγtδ1t
σ2X(1− χt)
[δ1t(Mt − Lt)dt+ σXdZt], (16)
with Zt :=
1
σX
[Xt −
´ t
0
(δ0s + δ1sMs + δ2sLs)ds] being a Brownian motion.
The dynamic (15) illustrates how the long-run player expects her future choices to affect
her future beliefs. In particular, she will revise her belief upward when a′t > Et[α0t +α2tLt +
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α3tMˆt], i.e., when she expects to beat the myopic player’s expectation of her own behavior.
The intensity of the revision is given by γtα3t/σ
2
Y : it increases with both the myopic player’s
uncertainty (γ) and his conjecture of the long-run player’s strength of signaling (α3). Further,
it is clear that M is deterministic only if δ1/σX ≡ 0, exactly as in Section 2.14
The appearance of M in the drift of (16) shows that the long-run player expects to
influence L, despite her actions not entering the public signal: this happens through her
influence on the myopic player’s behavior. Consequently, a signal-jamming effect arises:
the incentive to influence a public belief (albeit only indirectly), with such incentives being
perfectly accounted for in equilibrium—this effect is obviously absent in the no-feedback case
(σX =∞). The drift of (16) also shows that L chases M on average, reflecting that someone
who only observes X is able to gradually learn the long-run player’s type over time.
Finally, observe that the pair (γ, χ) appears explicitly in the evolution of (M,L). Indeed,
this is because of the role of (γ, χ) in the myopic player’s learning process: since deviations
are hidden, this player always assumes that (10) holds when constructing his belief.
Remark 2 (M as a function of past actions). In Lemma 3, insert the definition of Zt into
(15) to solve for Mt as a linear function of (as, Ls, Xs)s<t, where Ls is a linear function of
(Xτ )τ<s via (14). The resulting expression generalizes (3) for the no-feedback case.
4.2 Dynamic Programming and the Boundary-Value Problem
The long-run player’s best-response problem. Given a conjecture ~β := (β0, β1, β2, β3)
by the myopic player, ~δ := (δ0, δ1, δ2) is found by matching coefficients in
aˆt := δ0t + δ1tMˆt + δ2tLt = arg max
aˆ′
Eˆt[Uˆ(α0t + α2tLt + α3tθ, aˆ′, θ)], (17)
with ~α := (α0, α2, α3) as in (11). Since the flow U(at, aˆt, θ) is quadratic and Mt := Et[Mˆt],
we can write the long-run player’s total payoff as a function of (Mt)t∈[0,T ] as follows:
E0
[ ˆ T
0
e−rtU(at, δ0t + δ1tMt + δ2tLt, θ)dt
]
+
1
2
∂2U
∂aˆ2
ˆ T
0
e−rtδ21tγtχtdt. (18)
Indeed, in writing Et[Mˆ2t ] = M2t +Et[(Mt−Mˆt)2], the Gaussian learning structure guarantees
that the variances Et[(Mt − Mˆt)2] are independent of the long-run player’s actual behavior,
determined instead by the candidate equilibrium profile; by Lemma 1, their value is χtγt.
From here, it is clear that (t, θ, L,M) is a sufficient statistic for the long-run player, with
14Our choice of dynamic programming over optimal control in Section 2 is not only due to the deterministic
property being nongeneric: the latter approach obscures how the history-inference effect shapes signaling.
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the time variable capturing time-horizon effects and the learning effects encoded in (γ, χ).
The long-run player’s problem can then be stated as maximizing (18) subject to the
dynamics (15)–(16) of (M,L), which depend on (γ, χ) satisfying (12)–(13).15 To tackle this
best response problem, we postulate a quadratic value function
V (θ,m, `, t) = v0t + v1tθ + v2tm+ v3t`+ v4tθ
2 + v5tm
2 + v6t`
2 + v7tθm+ v8tθ`+ v9tm`,
where vi·, i = 0, ..., 9 depend on time only. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is
rV = sup
a′
{
U˜(a′,Et[aˆt], θ) + Vt + µM(a′)Vm + µLV` +
σ2M
2
Vmm + σMσLVm` +
σ2L
2
V``
}
,
where U˜ := U + 1
2
∂2U
∂aˆ2
δ21tγtχt, µM(a
′) and µL (respectively, σM and σL) denote the drifts
(respectively, volatilities) in (15) and (16), and aˆt is determined via (17).
A Nash equilibrium in linear Markov strategies immediately follows when β0t + β1tM +
β2tL + β3tθ is an optimal policy for the long-run player. Indeed, along the path of play of
such a policy, the representation (10) holds by construction, and so the long-run player’s
behavior is given by at = α0t + α2tLt + α3tθ, where (Lt)t∈[0,T ] follows (14) in Lemma 1; i.e.,
actions are a function of (t, θ,X) exclusively. However, conditioning differently on L and
M is profitable after deviations—the policy β0t + β1tM + β2tL + β3tθ then specifies how to
behave at such off-path histories, effectively inducing an LME that is also perfect.16
The boundary-value problem (BVP). We briefly explain how to obtain a system of
ordinary differential equations (ODEs) for ~β. Letting a(θ,m, `, t) denote the maximizer of
the right-hand side in the HJB equation, the first-order condition (FOC) reads
∂U
∂a
(a(θ,m, `, t), δ0t + δ1tm+ δ2t`, θ) +
γtα3t
σ2Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
dMt/dat
[v2t + 2v5tm+ v7tθ + v9t`]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vm(θ,m,`,t)
= 0. (19)
Solving for a(θ,m, `, t) in (19), the equilibrium condition becomes a(θ,m, `, t) = β0t +
β1tm + β2t` + β3tθ, which is a linear equation. We can then solve for (v2, v5, v7, v9) as a
function of the coefficients ~β and insert the resulting expressions into the HJB equation
along with a(θ,m, `, t) = β0t + β1tm + β2t` + β3tθ, to obtain a system of ODEs for the ~β
15The long-run player’s problem is, in practice, one of optimally controlling an unobserved state. We are
allowed to filter first and then optimize, because the separation principle applies. See the proof of Lemma 3.
16The myopic player’s behavior is specified in (17), where (t, L, Mˆ) is the relevant state ((B.1) shows how
Mˆ evolves). While deviations by this player do affect L, it is clear that no additional states are needed for
our players after deviations. Also, all the payoff-relevant histories are reachable on path, so the sequential
rationality requirement is trivial for this player in an LME. All this is true if this player is forward looking.
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coefficients. Critically, the system is coupled with the ODEs that v6 and v8 satisfy (and that
are readily obtained from the HJB equation): since M feeds into L (see 16), the envelope
condition with respect to the controlled state M cannot deliver a self-contained system for
the optimal policy. Finally, because the pair (γ, χ) affects the law of motion of (M,L), it
also influences (~β, v6, v8), and so the ODEs (12)–(13) must be included.
This procedure leads to a system of ODEs for (β0, β1, β2, β3, v6, v8, γ, χ); we also need
the boundary conditions. First, there are the exogenous initial conditions that γ and χ
satisfy, i.e., γ0 = γ
o > 0 and χ0 = 0. Second, there are terminal conditions v6T = v8T = 0
due to the absence of a lump-sum terminal payoff in the long-run player’s problem. Third,
and more interesting, there are endogenous terminal conditions that are determined by the
static (Bayes) Nash equilibrium that arises from myopic play at time T . In fact, letting
u0 :=
∂U/∂a
|∂2U/∂a2|(0, 0, 0) and uˆ0 :=
∂Uˆ/∂aˆ
|∂2Uˆ/∂aˆ2|(0, 0, 0) denote the intercepts of the players’ static
best responses, it is easy to verify that this equilibrium entails the coefficients
β0T =
u0 + uaaˆuˆ0
1− uaaˆuˆaˆa , β1T =
uaaˆ[uaθuˆaˆa + uˆaˆθ]
1− uaaˆuˆaˆaχT , β2T =
u2aaˆuˆaˆa[uaθuˆaˆa + uˆaˆθ](1− χT )
(1− uaaˆuˆaˆa)(1− uaaˆuˆaˆaχT ) , β3T = uaθ.
By part (iv) in Assumption 1 and the fact that χT ∈ (0, 1), the previous denominators never
vanish, so the equilibrium indeed always exists.17 Moreover, the terminal signaling coefficient
α3T = β3T + β1TχT is proportional to uaθ + uaaˆuˆaˆθχT , which, by part (ii) in Assumption 1,
never vanishes either. This latter property is sufficient for the dynamic equilibria that we
construct to always exhibit nontrivial signaling throughout the game.18
We conclude that b := (β0, β1, β2, β3, v6, v8, γ, χ)
T satisfies a BVP of the form
b˙t = f(bt), s.t. D0b0 + DTbT = (B(χT )
T, γo, 0)T (20)
where f : R6×R+×[0, 1)→ R8; D0 := diag(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) and DT := diag(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
are diagonal matrices; and B(χ) : [0, 1]→ R6 carries the terminal conditions via
B(χ) :=
(
u0 + uaaˆuˆ0
1− uaaˆuˆaˆa ,
uaaˆ[uaθuˆaˆa + uˆaˆθ]
1− uaaˆuˆaˆaχ ,
u2aaˆuˆaˆa[uaθuˆaˆa + uˆaˆθ](1− χ)
(1− uaaˆuˆaˆa)(1− uaaˆuˆaˆaχ) , uaθ, 0, 0
)T
∈ R6. (21)
The general expression that f(·) in (20) takes for a generic pair (U, Uˆ) satisfying Assumption
1 is long, and can be found in spm.nb on our websites. (There, to simplify notation, we work
with normalized payoffs U/|∂2U/∂a2| and Uˆ/|∂2Uˆ/∂aˆ2|.) In the next subsection, we provide
17If both players are myopic, the strategies carry coefficients with χt as above, t ∈ [0, T ]. By the arguments
used for Lemma 2, the induced system in (γ, χ) has a unique solution, so there is a unique LME for all T > 0.
18This requirement at time T can be relaxed, but it is beyond our scope of interest. Also, it is easy to see
that δ0T = uˆ0 + uˆaˆaβ0T , δ1T = uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆa[β3T + β1TχT ] and δ2T = uˆaˆa[β2T + β1T (1− χT )].
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examples that exhibit all the relevant properties that any such f(·) can satisfy.
The task of finding an LME is then reduced to solving the BVP (20) (and checking that
the rest of the coefficients in the value function are well defined, which is a simpler task).
4.3 Existence of Linear Markov Perfect Equilibria
In this section, we present two existence results for LME. Behind these results are two ap-
proaches to separately address common and private-value environments, as the correspond-
ing BVPs have a different structure linked to the extent of asymmetry between the players’
signaling rates that arise in each case. For the sake of exposition, we state the theorems for
variations of the leadership game of Section 2. The “common-value” method is, nevertheless,
fully general and can be exported to other asymmetric settings.
The shooting problem. Establishing the existence of a solution to the BVP (20) is
complex because there are multiple ODEs in both directions: (~β, v6, v8) is traced backward
from its terminal values, while (γ, χ) is traced forward using its initial values—see Figure 2.
This means that some notion of “shooting” must be applied: say, to construct a backward
initial value problem (IVP) in which (γ, χ) has a parametrized initial condition at T , and be
able to ensure that the terminal value (now, at 0) exactly matches (γo, 0). Attempting to use
traditional continuity arguments widely used for one-dimensional problems—i.e., tracing the
initial condition over an interval so that the target is hit by continuity—is hopeless: accurate
knowledge of the relationship between γ and χ at T for all possible coefficients ~β would be
required to find the right “tracing path” in a multidimensional domain.
γo
0
χ
T
β  (χ  ,γ )
γt
t
i,T T T
v  (χ  ,γ )i,T T T
Static
Nash
.
..
B(χ  ,γ )T T
Figure 2: The tuple (γ, χ) has initial conditions, while (~β, v6, v8) has terminal ones. We have allowed
for non-zero v’s and for a dependence on γT , as this can occur if terminal payoffs are allowed.
The reason behind this dimensionality problem is the asymmetry in the environment: the
rate at which the long-run player signals, α3 := β3+β1χ, can be very different from the myopic
player’s counterpart, δ1. When this is the case, a nontrivial history dependence between γ and
χ—reflected in the coupled system of ODEs they satisfy—ensues. Two questions naturally
arise: first, under what conditions can such history dependence be simplified; second, how
can one tackle the issue of existence of LME when a simplification is not feasible?
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Private values: one-dimensional shooting. We say that the environment is one of
private values if the myopic player’s flow utility satisfies uˆaˆθ = 0, i.e., his best reply does not
directly depend on his belief about θ, but only indirectly via the long-run player’s action.
Otherwise, the setting is one of common values (despite the long-run player knowing θ).
In a private-value setting, the players signal to each other at rates that are proportional.
Indeed, the weight attached to Mˆ in the myopic player’s best response becomes δ1 = uˆaˆaα3.
Lemma 4 (One-to-one mapping). Suppose that β1 and β3 are continuous and that δ1 =
uˆaˆaα3. If uˆaˆa 6= 0, there are positive constants c1, c2 and d independent of γo such that
χt =
c1c2(1− [γt/γo]d)
c1 + c2[γt/γo]d
.
Moreover, (i) 0 ≤ χt < c2 < 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and (ii) c2 → 0 as σX → 0 and c2 → 1 as
σX →∞. If instead uˆaˆa = 0 or σX =∞, χt = 1− γt/γo.
Private-value settings, by inducing proportional signaling rates, create useful symmetry:
while the players’ posterior variances are not proportional, there is a decreasing relationship
between χ and γ at all times. By (i), χ is uniformly below 1 if the public signal is informative,
reflecting that the scope for the history-inference effect falls relative to the no-feedback
case. By (ii), the public and no-feedback cases are recovered as we take limits; further, the
characterization of χ obtained in the latter case is recovered when, in addition, uˆaˆa = 0.
This result enables the use of standard one-dimensional shooting arguments, making our
leadership application of Section 2 a valid laboratory: the game has private values because the
follower wants to match the leader’s action. Below is the corresponding BVP for σX ∈ (0,∞)
and, for simplicity, for r = 0; we omit the ODE for β0 because it is uncoupled and linear:
v˙6t = β
2
2t + 2β1tβ2t(1− χt)− β21t(1− χt)2 +
2v6tα
2
3tγtχt
σ2X(1− χt)
v˙8t = −2β2t − 2(1− 2α3t)β1t(1− χt)− 4β21tχt(1− χt) +
v8tα
2
3tγtχt
σ2X(1− χt)
β˙1t =
α3tγt
2σ2Xσ
2
Y (1− χt)
{
2σ2X(α3t − β1t)β1t(1− χt)− α23tβ1tγtχtv8t
−2σ2Y α3tχt(β2t − β1t[1− χt − 2β2tχt])
}
β˙2t =
α3tγt
2σ2Xσ
2
Y (1− χt)
{
2σ2Xβ
2
1t(1− χt)2 + 2σ2Y α3tβ2tχ2t (1− 2β2t)− α23tγtχt(2v6t + β2tv8t)
}
β˙3t =
α3tγt
2σ2Xσ
2
Y (1− χt)
{−2σ2Xβ1t(1− χt)β3t + 2σ2Y α3tβ2tχ2t (1− 2β3t)− α23tβ3tγtχtv8t}
γ˙t = −γ
2
t α
2
3t
σ2Y
,
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with boundary conditions v6T = v8T = 0, β1T =
1
2(2−χT ) , β2T =
1−χT
2(2−χT ) , β3T =
1
2
and
γ0 = γ
o, and where α3 := β3 +β1χ and χt is as in the previous lemma. We have the following:
Theorem 1 (Existence of LME—private values). Let σX ∈ (0,∞) and r = 0. There exists a
strictly positive T (γo) ∈ O(1/γo) such that, for all T < T (γo), there is an LME based on the
solution to the previous BVP that satisfies β0t = 0, β1t+β2t+β3t = 1 and α3t > 0, t ∈ [0, T ].
The key step in the proof is to show that (β1, β2, β3, v6, v8, γ) can be bounded uniformly
over [0, T (γo)), for some T (γo) > 0, when γt ∈ [0, γo] at all times. This implies that tracing
the (parametrized) initial condition of γ in the backward IVP from 0 upwards will lead to
at least one γ-path landing at γo due to the continuity of the solutions with respect to the
initial conditions, while the rest of the ODEs still admit solutions.
Figure 3 below illustrates the signaling coefficient α3 for various values of σX : as the
latter increases, the dashed lines rotate counterclockwise from the public to the no-feedback
case, justifying our earlier focus on σX ∈ {0,∞}. Interestingly, when r > 0 and σX <∞, α3
is nonmonotonic. Intuitively, a partially informative signal combines the increasing history-
inference effect of the no-feedback case with the decreasing signaling motive driving the
public case. Discounting weakens the latter, while the former grows over time even with a
myopic leader. As σX increases, moreover, the history-inference effect gains strength and
the maximum of α3 shifts to the right. Only a fully dynamic model can uncover such effects.
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Figure 3: Signaling coefficients for σX ∈ {0, .1, .75, 2, 10,+∞}; “α Interior” denotes α3.
Theorem 1 can be easily generalized to accommodate a conflict of interest between the
players. Indeed, the one-to-one mapping between γ and χ still holds for any best response
of the myopic player that is a time-independent affine function of his expectation of the
long-run player’s action. We defer a discussion of this topic to the common-value setting,
where we address asymmetries at a more general level.
19Existence in the discounted case can be shown with identical methods. For sharper visual effects, we are
potentially plotting beyond the interval of existence ensured by the theorem (which is a crude lower bound).
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Common-value settings: fixed-point methods. When α3 and δ1 are not proportional,
χ can depend on both current and past values of γ—the dimensionality problem resurfaces.
Our key observation is that finding a solution to any given instance of the BVP (20) is,
mathematically, a fixed-point problem. Specifically, note that the static Nash equilibrium at
time T depends on the value that χ takes at that point. The latter value, however, depends
on how much signaling has taken place along the way, i.e., on values of the coefficients ~β at
times prior to T . Those values, in turn, depend on the value of the equilibrium coefficients
at T by backward induction—thus, we are back to the same point where we started.
Our approach therefore applies a fixed-point argument adapted from the literature on
BVPs with intertemporal linear constraints (Keller, 1968) to our problem with intratemporal
nonlinear constraints. Because the method is novel and has the generality required to become
useful in other settings, we briefly elaborate on how it works.
In essence, we will be “shooting” six ODEs forward. Specifically, let t 7→ bt(s, γo, 0)
denote a solution to the forward IVP version of (20) when the initial condition is (s, γo, 0),
with s ∈ R6 parametrizing the initial value of (~β, v6, v8). From Lemma 2, the last two
components of b, i.e., γ and χ, admit solutions as long as the others do; moreover, there are
no constraints on their terminal values. Thus, for our fixed-point argument, we can focus on
the first six components in b := (β0, β1, β2, β3, v6, v8, γ, χ)
T by defining the gap function
g(s) = B(χT (s, γ
o, 0))−DT
ˆ T
0
f(bt(s, γ
o, 0))dt,
where DT := diag(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0). This function measures the distance between the total
growth of (~β, v6, v8) (last term), and its target value, B(χT (s, γ
o, 0)). By (21), B(χ) is
nonlinear : the static equilibrium imposes nonlinear relationships across variables at time T .
By definition, b0(s, γ
o, 0) = s. Consequently, it follows that
g(s) = s ⇐⇒ B(χT (s, γo, 0)) = s+ DT
ˆ T
0
f(bt(s, γ
o, 0))dt = DTbT (s, γ
o, 0),
where the last equality follows from the definition of the ODE-system that DTb satisfies.
Thus, the shooting problem of finding s ∈ R6 such that B(χT (s, γo, 0)) = DTbT (s, γo, 0) can
be restated as one of finding a fixed point of the function g.20
The goal is then to find a time T (γo) and a compact set S such that (i) for all s ∈ S,
20A BVP with intertemporal linear constraints (Keller, 1968) differs from ours in that D0b0 + DTbT =
(B(χT )
T, γo, 0)T becomes Ab0 + BbT = ζ, where ζ is a constant column vector and A and B are general
matrices. On the one hand, since A and B are not necessarily diagonal matrices, one may not be able to
dispense with a subset of the system. On the other hand, our version of ζ is a nonlinear function of a subset
of (endogenous) components of bT , which makes the fixed-point argument more involved.
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a unique solution to the aforementioned IVP over [0, T (γo)] exists, and (ii) g is continuous
from S to itself. The natural choice for S is a ball with center s0 := B(0), the terminal
condition of the trivial game with T = 0; we then apply Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.
We can now establish our main existence result for a variation of the leadership ap-
plication in which the follower’s best response is of the form aˆt = uˆaˆθEˆt[θ] + uˆaˆaEˆt[at]
for (uˆaˆθ, uˆaˆa) as in Assumption 1; in particular, the myopic player’s signaling coefficient
is δ1t = uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaα3t.
21 The BVP is stated in (B.8)-(B.14) in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 (Existence of LME—common values). Set σX ∈ (0,∞) and r = 0 in the
leadership model, and let (uˆaˆθ, uˆaˆa) ∈ R2 satisfy Assumption 1. There is a strictly positive
function T (γo) ∈ O(1/γo) such that if T < T (γo), there exists an LME based on the BVP
(B.8)-(B.14). In such an equilibrium, α3 > 0.
There are three observations from this theorem. First, the time for which an LME is en-
sured to exist grows without bound as γo ↘ 0. Indeed, f(·) naturally scales with this param-
eter, so the solutions converge to the full-information benchmark (β0, β1, β2, β3, v6, v8, χ, γ) =
(0, uaaˆ[uaθuˆaˆa + uˆaˆθ],
u2aaˆuˆaˆa[uaθuˆaˆa+uˆaˆθ]
1−uaaˆuˆaˆa , uaθ, 0, 0, 0, 0), which is defined for all T > 0.
Second, while the self-map condition does not affect the order of T (γo) relative to Theo-
rem 1, it is not vacuous either. In fact, since s0 = B(0) is the center of S, we have that
g(s)− s0 = B(χT (s, γo, 0))−B(0)−DT
ˆ T
0
f(bt(s, γ
o, 0))dt.
Bounding B(χT (s, γ
o, 0))−B(0) therefore imposes an additional constraint relative to those
that ensure that the system is uniformly bounded (which in turn bound the last integral).
Finally, the bound T (γo) is obtained under minimal knowledge of the system: it is the
outcome of bounds that only exploit the degree of the polynomials in f(b) and hence that do
not exploit any relationship between the equilibrium coefficients. Thus, the proof technique
is (i) fully general and (ii) improvable provided more is known about the system at hand.
Appendix B.3 sketches how the proof of Theorem 2 applies to the whole class of games
satisfying Assumption 1. Moreover, observe that this method, by being able to handle
multiple ODEs in each direction, has the power to be applied to other asymmetric games of
learning beyond the class under study (see the concluding remarks for more on this topic).
Asymmetric games. Let us briefly elaborate on how Theorems 1 and 2 enable us to
explore natural settings in which the players rates of signaling are inevitably different.
21Since uaaˆ = uaθ = 1/2 for the leader, signaling is nontrivial if uˆaˆθ > −1; best responses intersect if
uˆaˆa < 2; and second-order inferences arise if (uˆaˆθ, uˆaˆa) 6= (0, 0). Intercepts can be easily incorporated.
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The simplest common-value version of the leadership game is one where the follower only
wants to match the state of the world. In this case, the equilibrium obtained in Proposition
1 for the public case still goes through, but the equilibrium for σX > 0 changes. Specifically,
since the follower now behaves according to aˆ = Mˆ as opposed to aˆ = α3Mˆ , his actions
are more sensitive to his private information. This, in turn, magnifies the leader’s signaling
in two ways: the leader has a stronger incentive to steer the follower’s behavior (i.e., β3
increases), and due to the imperfect learning, the leader relies more on M (at the expense
of L) to coordinate (i.e., β1 also increases). This results in more signaling and learning,
also compounded by an overall higher χ in the history-inference effect (despite the negative
direct impact that a more informative X has on the reliance on past play); the left and center
panels in Figure 4 illustrate these forces. It is noteworthy that this example must utilize
our most general Theorem 2, in spite of its a priori simplicity stemming from the follower’s
myopic best reply being independent of the leader’s strategy.
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Figure 4: Signaling (left) and learning (center) for Uˆ(a, aˆ, θ) = −λ(aˆ − θ)2 − (1 − λ)(aˆ − a)2,
λ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}. Right: Leader’s strategy coefficients for follower payoffs − (aˆ− (3/2)a)2.
Asymmetries also naturally arise from a conflict of interest between the players. Let us
now use Theorem 1. In the leadership application, fixing the leader’s payoffs, incentives are
misaligned if uˆaˆa + uˆaˆθ 6= 1 on the follower’s side. Suppose then that uˆ0 = uˆaˆθ = 0 and
uˆaˆa > 1, i.e., the follower overreacts to the leader’s action. If the horizon is sufficiently
long, the leader has an initial incentive to invest in mitigating the follower’s reaction by
shrinking the latter’s belief, so β1 and β2 (the weights on M and L, respectively) are negative.
Furthermore, the right panel in Figure 4 shows that β2 is the main component in this attempt:
the manipulation occurs largely via the leader jamming the public belief L, as her direct
incentives to coordinate soon are strong. Finally, as the time to enjoy the benefits of such
manipulation shrinks, the leader accommodates the follower, and these effects reverse.
We have chosen to continue with the leadership application for expositional reasons. In
the next section, we explore other applications based on extensions of our baseline model.
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5 Extensions
We extend our model to allow (i) a quadratic terminal payoff in a career-concerns model,
and (ii) the long-run player affecting the public signal in a trading model a la Kyle (1985).
5.1 Reputation for Neutrality
Suppose that the long-run player is now an expert or politician with career concerns. This
agent has a hidden ideological bias θ and takes repeated actions—for example, adopting
positions on critical issues or making campaign promises. The mean of the prior distribution
denotes the unbiased type—without loss, let us use the normalization µ = 0.
We interpret the myopic player as a news outlet that always attempts to report on the
true bias, i.e., that maximizes −Eˆt[(aˆt − θ)2] at all times. In turn, the politician’s payoff is
−
ˆ T
0
(at − θ)2dt− ψaˆ2T ,
with ψ > 0. Given the myopic player’s preferences, the termination payoff takes the form
−ψMˆ2T , and so the politician has career concerns: she wants to appear as unbiased at the
end of the horizon. But this long-term goal conflicts with her short-term ideological desires:
in her flow payoff, she benefits from taking actions that conform to her bias.
The private nature of dY = atdt + σY dZ
Y
t is understood as the outlet having access to
imperfect private sources regarding the politician’s actions. In turn, dXt = Mˆtdt+σXdZ
X
t is
the outlet’s news process: the (public) reporting on the bias is fair on average, but imperfect.
When does the politician fare better? In settings where the reporting is precise—i.e., low
σX—and hence she can tailor her actions to her reputation? Clearly, noisier environments
entail a direct cost: they introduce increased uncertainty over a concave objective. The
next result shows that increasing an agent’s uncertainty over her own reputation, thereby
undermining her ability to take appropriate actions, can be beneficial:
Proposition 5. (i) Suppose that σX ∈ {0,+∞}. Then, for all ψ, T > 0 there exists an
LME. Moreover, if ψ < σ2Y /γ
o, the LME is unique, and learning is lower and ex ante
payoffs higher in the no-feedback case.
(ii) If σX ∈ (0,∞), there exists T (γo) ∈ O(1/γo) s.t. an LME exists for all T < T (γo).
Politicians or experts with larger biases take more extreme actions, and hence the equilib-
rium strategy attaches a positive weight to the type. Because of career concerns, however, the
greater the perceived value of Mˆ , the greater the incentive to manipulate it downward. With
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private monitoring, higher types therefore must offset higher beliefs from their perspectives,
leading to a history-inference effect that dampens the signaling coefficient α3. The belief is
then less responsive from an ex ante perspective, which facilitates maintaining a reputation
for neutrality.22 Indeed, provided that the objective is not too concave and the environment
not too uncertain (which strengthen the direct cost), this strategic effect dominates.
Regarding (ii), because this environment is one of common values, one can establish
the existence of an LME with minimal changes to the method behind Theorem 2. Indeed,
the only difference is that our baseline BVP changes to incorporate terminal conditions
that depend not only on χT , but also on γT via β1T = − ψγTσ2Y +ψγTχT : with terminal lump-
sum payoffs, there are last-minute incentives to manipulate the myopic player’s belief that
decrease in the associated precision. Our approach does not vary with this dependence.
5.2 Insider Trading
An asset with fixed fundamental value θ is traded in continuous time until date T , the time
at which its true value is revealed, ending the game. A patient insider (the long-run player)
privately observes θ prior to the start of the game. As in Yang and Zhu (2019), a second
trader has a technology that allows him to privately observe imperfect signals of the insider’s
trades; this player is myopic. Both players and a flow of noise traders submit orders to a
market maker who then executes those trades at a public price Lt = E[θ|FXt ].
We depart from the baseline model along three dimensions. First, the public signal—the
total order flow—is dXt = (at + aˆt)dt + σXdZ
X
t , which now includes the long-run player’s
action; hence, the myopic player learns from both the private monitoring channel and the
public price. Second, the players’ flow payoffs depend directly on L, interpreted as the action
taken by the market maker: the myopic player’s flow payoff is given by ξ(θ−L)aˆ− aˆ2
2
, where
ξ ≥ 0, while the long-run player’s flow payoff is (θ − Lt)at; the inverse of the parameter ξ
is a measure of transaction costs for the myopic player. Finally, observe that the long-run
player’s flow payoff is linear in her action at at all instants t ∈ [0, T ].
Following the literature, we seek an equilibrium in which the informed trader reveals her
private information gradually over time through a linear strategy of the form (8). Hence,
we require that the coefficients of the insider’s strategy be C1 functions over strict compact
subsets of [0, T ); we can then apply Lemmas 1 and 2 to such sets.23
22It is easy to show that the ex ante expectation of Mˆ2T is γ
o−γT , so that greater learning by the myopic
player results in larger terminal losses for the long-run player. This reverses for slightly negative ψ, but so
does the history-inference effect: there is more learning but again a higher payoff in the no-feedback case.
23The C1 requirement suffices for the total order to be “inverted” from the price for t < T (hence, it is
without loss to make X the source of public information), while the open interval allows for the possibility
of full revelation of information by time T . The proof of Lemma 1 derives learning ODEs for an additive
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Clearly, when ξ = 0 (or σY =∞), the model reduces to Kyle (1985), and hence an LME
with trading strategy of the form β3(θ − L) always exists. This is not the case when ξ > 0.
Proposition 6. Fix ξ > 0. For all σY > 0, there does not exist a linear Markov equilibrium.
With linear Markov strategies, the myopic player acquires private information about θ
over time. Thus, the myopic player’s own repeated trades carry further information to the
market maker, beyond that which the market maker learns from the insider alone. This
introduces momentum into the price from the insider’s perspective, measured by a term
ξ(m− l) in the drift of L. Future trades then become less attractive to the insider, thereby
placing the insider in a race against herself that results in all her information being traded
away in the first instant, regardless of the amount of noise in the private signal Y .24
In a closely related result, Yang and Zhu (2019) show that a linear equilibrium can cease
to exist in a two-period setting where a trader who only participates in the last round re-
ceives a sufficiently precise signal of an informed player’s first-period trade; a mixed-strategy
equilibrium emerges instead. More generally, the existence problem relates to how, with
common information, an informed player’s rush to trade depends on the number of trading
opportunities. The analysis of Foster and Viswanathan (1994) is illuminating in this respect:
in a setting with nested information structures, a better informed insider trades a commonly
known piece of information first, exploiting her superior information only later. While there
are important differences between our setups (in their model, the belief of the less informed
player is always known to the more informed player, and the common source of information is
exogenous) there is a unifying theme: once common information is created, there is pressure
to trade quickly on it. Such pressure increases with the number of rounds ahead.25
6 Conclusion
We have examined an important departure from the vast literature on signaling games:
the case of a sender who does not see the signals emanating from her actions. A complex
“beliefs about beliefs” problem arises in this case and leads to a novel separation effect via
a second-order belief channel. Our contributions—namely, constructing belief-dependent
equilibria and quantifying the impact of this natural separation effect on outcomes, along
with the necessary new methodologies introduced—are at the frontier of what is known in
these settings.
drift in X, and it is easy to see that the steps of Lemma 2 (with uˆaˆθ = ξ, uˆaˆa = 0) go through for this case.
24The linearity of the setting prevents a Nash equilibrium from being defined at T . Thus, our argument
does not stem from a problem with a BVP but rather an impossibility of indifference for the long-run player.
25For a similar result in a symmetric setting, see Back et al. (2000). Both the presence of a myopic
counterpart and a quadratic trading cost for this player only strengthen our nonexistence result.
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We conclude with a discussion of our modeling and expositional choices. First, the signal
structure that we employ is important in that it enables us to “close” the set of states at
the second order. If instead the long-run player had a stochastic type, more states would be
needed at the very least; and if both players had access to imperfect private signals, beliefs of
even higher order would be payoff-relevant. While these are interesting exercises, a natural
question is whether behavior truly relies on such considerably more complex strategies.
Second, a model with a forward-looking receiver is a tractable extension that requires no
major conceptual changes. In fact, most of the results are derived for, or can be generalized
to, continuous coefficients in the myopic player’s strategy. Those coefficients would then
satisfy ODEs capturing optimal dynamic behavior, but crucially (i) no additional states
are needed, and (ii) the fixed-point argument is applicable to an enlarged boundary value
problem. Such an extension, however, only brings an old known force to the analysis: since
X is public, a forward-looking receiver would exhibit a traditional signal-jamming motive.
Our choice of applications stems from their proximity to our informational assumptions,
but others are also plausible: a deception game for business or military strategy arises in an
asymmetric version of our coordination game in which the leader enjoys miscoordination; a
leadership model to study encouragement effects is obtained when complementarities between
the state of the world and aggregate effort are allowed; and trading models with quadratic
trading costs that restore existence can shed light on an informed trader’s behavior.
Finally, while stylized, the linear-quadratic-Gaussian class is of great value. First, it un-
covers effects that are likely to be key in other, more nonlinear, settings: the history-inference
effect coupled with the time effects arising from learning seem to exhaust the forces present
when behavior depends on the payoff-relevant aspects of the histories. Second, it permits
the development of methods that are exportable to other settings: the fixed-point method
for BVPs, by handling multidimensional shooting, has the power to be taken to asymmetric
oligopolies with private information, or to reputation models with multidimensional types.
Appendix A: Proofs for Section 2
Preliminary results. We state standard results on ODEs (Teschl, 2012) which we use in
the proofs that follow. Let f(t, x) be continuous from [0, T ]× Rn to Rn, where T > 0.
- Peano’s Theorem (Theorem 2.19, p. 56): There exists T ′ ∈ (0, T ), such that there is
at least one solution to the IVP x˙ = f(t, x), x(0) = x0 over t ∈ [0, T ′).
If, moreover, f is locally Lipschitz continuous in x, uniformly in t, then:
- Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem (Theorem 2.2, p. 38): For (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn, there is an
open interval I over which the IVP x˙ = f(t, x), x(t0) = x0 admits a unique solution.
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- Comparison theorem (Theorem 1.3, p. 27): If x(·), y(·) are differentiable, x(t0) ≤ y(t0)
for some t0 ∈ [0, T ), and x˙t − f(t, x(t)) ≤ y˙t − f(t, y(t)) ∀t ∈ [t0, T ), then x(t) ≤ y(t)
∀t ∈ [t0, T ). If, moreover, x(t) < y(t) for some t ∈ [t0, T ), then x(s) < y(s) ∀s ∈ [t, T ).
A.1: Proofs for Public Case
Proof of Proposition 1. We aim to characterize an LME in which the leader backs out the
follower’s belief from his action at all times, with strategies of the form at = β0t+β1tMˆt+β3tθ
and aˆt = Eˆt[at] = β0t+(β1t+β3t)Mˆt, where Mˆt := Eˆt[θ], and βit, i = 0, 1, 3, are deterministic,
satisfying β1t + β3t 6= 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. From standard results in filtering theory, if the follower
expects (at)t≥0 as above, then whenever he is on path26 his beliefs are θ ∼ N (Mˆt, γt), where
dMˆt =
β3tγt
σ2Y
[dYt − {β0t + (β1t + β3t)Mˆt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Eˆt[at]=
dt], Mˆ0 = µ and γ˙t = −
(
γtβ3t
σ2Y
)2
, γ0 = γ
o.(A.1)
Let V : R2 × [0, T ] → R denote the leader’s value function. The HJB equation is
rV = sup
a∈R
{−(a− θ)2− (a− aˆt)2 + β3tγtσ2Y [a− β0t− (β1t + β3t)m]Vm +
β23tγ
2
t
2σ2Y
Vmm + Vt}. We guess
a quadratic solution V (θ,m, t) = v0t + v1tθ + v2tm + v3tθ
2 + v4tm
2 + v5tθm, from which the
FOC in the HJB reads 0 = −2(β0t+β1tm+β3tθ− θ)−2β3t(θ−m) + β3tγt[v2t+2mv4t+θv5t]σ2Y when
the maximizer is a∗ := β0t + β1tm+ β3tθ.
From here, (v2t, v4t, v5t) =
(
2σ2Y β0t
β3tγt
,
σ2Y (β1t−β3t)
β3tγt
,
2σ2Y (2β3t−1)
β3tγt
)
, due to the FOC holding for all
(θ,m, t) ∈ R2× [0, T ]. And since viT = 0 for i ∈ {0, . . . , 5}, we deduce that (β0T , β1T , β3T ) =
(0, 1/2, 1/2), the myopic equilibrium coefficients.
Inserting a∗ into the HJB equation, and using the previous expressions for (v2t, v4t, v5t) to
replace (v2t, v4t, v5t, v˙2t, v˙4t, v˙5t), yields an equation in ~β := (β0, β1, β3) and ~˙β. Grouping by co-
efficients (θ,m, θ2,..., etc.) in the latter, we obtain a system of ODEs for (v0, v1, v3, β0, β1, β3):
v˙0t = rv0t + β3tγt(β3t − β1t), v˙1t = rv1t − 2β0tβ3t, and v˙3t = 1 + rv3t − 2β23t along with
(β˙0t, β˙1t, β˙3t) =
(
2rβ0tβ3t, β3t
[
r(2β1t − 1) + β1tβ3tγt
σ2Y
]
, β3t
[
r(2β3t − 1)− β1tβ3tγt
σ2Y
])
,(A.2)
with conditions (v0T , v1T , v3T , β0T , β1T , β3T ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1/2, 1/2). Critically, observe that
solving the subsystem (β0, β1, β3, γ) delivers the remaining vi, as their ODEs are uncoupled
from one another and linear in themselves. The existence of a LME then reduces to the BVP
defined by the γ-ODE (A.1) and (A.2) above, with γ0 = γ
o and (β0T , β1T , β3T ) = (0, 1/2, 1/2).
To show existence, we transform this BVP into a backward (i.e., reversing the direction
26If instead of σX = 0, Y is public, this holds also after deviations by the myopic player; see footnote 5.
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of time) IVP problem, using a parametrized initial value for γ. Abusing notation,
(β˙0t, β˙1t, β˙3t, γ˙t) = β3t ×
(
−2rβ0t, r(1− 2β1t)− β1tβ3tγt
σ2Y
, r(1− 2β3t) + β1tβ3tγt
σY
,
β3tγ
2
t
σ2Y
)
, (A.3)
with initial conditions β00 = 0, β10 = β30 =
1
2
and γ0 = γ
F ≥ 0. Define BPubt := β1t + β3t.
Lemma A.1. Fix any γF ≥ 0. If a solution to the backward system exists over [0, T ], then
any such solution must have the following properties. If γF > 0, then (i) BPubt = 1 for all
t ∈ [0, T ], (ii) β3t ∈ (1/2, 1) and β1t ∈ (0, 1/2) for all t ∈ (0, T ], (iii) β3 is monotonically
increasing while β1 is monotonically decreasing, and (iv) γ is strictly increasing. If γ
F = 0,
then β1t = β3t =
1
2
and γt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. For any γF ≥ 0, β0 ≡ 0.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Because the system (A.3) is C1, the solution is unique when it exists.
If γF = 0, it is clear by inspection that (β0, β1, β3, γ) = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0) (uniquely) solves the
IVP, so assume hereafter that γF > 0. We first claim that β3 > 0. Indeed, let f
β3(t, β3t)
denote the RHS of the β3-ODE in (A.3). Letting xt := 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], we have β30 =
1/2 > x0 and β˙3t − fβ3(t, β3t) = 0 = x˙t − fβ3(t, xt); by the comparison theorem, the claim
follows. Now, add the ODEs that β1 and β3 satisfy to get B˙
Pub
t = 2rβ3t(1 − BPubt ) with
BPub0 = 1; because the RHS is of class C
1, it has a unique solution, which is clearly BPub = 1.
Hence, β1 + β3 = 1 and β˙3t = β3t
[
r(1− 2β3t) + β3t(1−β3t)γtσ2Y
]
, and we maintain the label
fβ3(t, β3t) for its RHS. Defining xt := 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ], then, x0 = 1 > β30 = 12 , and
β˙3t − fβ3(t, β3t) = 0 ≤ r = x˙t − fβ3(t, xt); thus, β3 < 1 and β1 = 1− β3 > 0.
Since β3 > 0, γ is clearly strictly increasing, and hence γt > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Now,
β˙3t =
1
2
[
0 + γt
4σ2Y
]
> 0 whenever β3t =
1
2
, and thus β3t > 1/2 and β1t < 1/2 for all t ∈ (0, T ].
We now turn to (iii). Since β˙1t + β˙3t = 0, we just show that β˙3 > 0; in turn, it suffices
to show that Ht := β˙3t/β3t = r(1 − 2β3t) + β3t(1−β3t)γtσ2Y > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Observe that
H0 =
γ0
4σ2Y
> 0, and with algebra it can be shown that if Ht = 0, H˙t =
(1−β3t)β33tγ2t
σ4Y
> 0. It
follows that H > 0 as desired. Finally, note that in all cases, we have β3 > 0, so from (A.3)
β0 ≡ 0. Also, as long as γF > 0, γ > 0, so (v2, v4, v5) are well defined.
It remains to show that there is a γF > 0 such that γT = γ
o in the backward system while
all the other ODEs admit solutions. As we argue in the proof of Theorem 1, it suffices to
show that the solutions are uniformly bounded when γt ∈ [0, γo] for t ∈ [0, T ]—refer to that
proof for the details of the argument. Applied to this context, the bounds β0, β1, β3 ∈ [0, 1]
from Lemma A.1 are valid more generally as long as γ does not explode, so there is indeed
a solution to the BVP, and hence a LME exists. To conclude, part (ii) in the proposition is
implied by Lemma A.1, while the uniqueness property is shown in the online appendix.
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A.2: Proofs for No-Feedback Case
Lemma A.2 (Belief Representation). Suppose that the follower expects at = [β0t + β1t(1−
χt)]µ+αtθ, where α = β3 +β1χ, χ = 1−γ/γo, and γt := Eˆt[(θ−Mˆt)2]. Then γ˙t = −
(
γtαt
σ2Y
)2
.
Moreover, if the leader follows (4), Mt = χtθ + (1− χt)µ holds at all times.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Anticipating at = α0tµ + αtθ, with α0 = [β0 + β1(1 − χ)]µ and α =
β3 + β1χ, the myopic player’s belief is ∼ N (Mt, γt) where dMˆt = αtγtσ2Y [dYt − (α0t + αtMˆt)dt]
and γ˙t = −γ
2
t α
2
t
σ2Y
. Thus, Mˆt = µR(t, 0) +
´ t
0
R(t, s)αsγs
σ2Y
[(as − α0s)ds + σY dZYs ] and Mt =
µR(t, 0) +
´ t
0
R(t, s)αsγs
σ2Y
(as − α0s)ds where R(t, s) = exp(−
´ t
s
α2uγu
σ2Y
du). Solving for M after
inserting at = β0tµ + β1tMt + β3tθ, and imposing the representation, it is easy to conclude
that (5) will hold if and only if χ˙t =
α2tγt
σ2Y
(1−χt). By arguments analogous to those used for
Lemma 2, the (γ, χ)-ODE pair admits a unique solution, and it satisfies χ = 1− γ/γo.
Proof of Proposition 2. If the leader uses at = β0tµ+ β1tMt + β3tθ then, using the represen-
tation Mt = χtθ + (1 − χt)µ, aˆt = Eˆt[at] = α0tµ + αtMt, where α0t := β0t + β1t[1 − χt and
αt = β1tχt+β3t. Taking an expectation in the leader’s flow payoff −(at−θ)2−(at− aˆt)2 then
yields that (θ,Mt, t) is the relevant state on and off path. (Indeed, expanding the squares in
the previous expression the only nontrivial component is Et[aˆ2t ], which makes Et[Mˆ2t ] appear;
however, Et[Mˆ2t ] = M2t + Et[(Mˆt −Mt)2] = M2t + γtχt after all private histories.27)
We can then set up the HJB equation. Since dMt =
αtγt
σ2Y
(a− α0t − αtm) dt from the proof
of Lemma A.2, rV = sup
a∈R
{−(a−θ)2−(a2 − 2a[α0t + αtm] + α20t + 2α0tαtm+ α2t [m2 + γtχt])+
Vt +
αtγt
σ2Y
(a− α0t − αtm)Vm}. We then guess V (θ,m, t) = v0t + v1tθ+ v2tm+ v3tθ2 + v4tm2 +
v5tθm and take analogous steps to those in the proof of Proposition 1. Namely, we first show
that there is a core BVP consisting of (β0, β1, β3, γ). Second, we construct a backward IVP
version of our original BVP that has a parametrized initial condition γF for the γ−ODE:28
β˙0t = αt(2σ
2
Y )
−1 × {−rσ2Y β0t(2− χt) + rσ2Y (1− χt)− 2γtβ21t(1− χt)} (A.4)
β˙1t = αt(2σ
2
Y )
−1 × {rσ2Y − 2β1t[β3tγt + rσ2Y (2− χt)] + 2β21tγt(1− χt)} (A.5)
β˙3t = αt(2σ
2
Y )
−1 × {rσ2Y (2− χt) + 2β3t[β1tγt − rσ2Y (2− χt)]} (A.6)
γ˙t = α
2
tγ
2
t /σ
2
Y (A.7)
with initial condition (β00, β10, β30, γ0) = (
1−χ0
2(2−χ0) ,
1
2(2−χ0) ,
1
2
, γF ) and where χ = 1− γ/γo.
27From the proof of Lemma A.2, Et[(Mˆt − Mt)2] = Et[(
´ t
0
R(t, s)αsγsσY dZ
Y
s )
2] =
´ t
0
R(t, s)2
α2sγ
2
s
σ2Y
ds =´ t
0
exp(2
´ t
s
γ˙u
γu
du)(−γ˙s)ds =
´ t
0
(γt/γs)
2
(−γ˙s)ds = γ2t (1/γt − 1/γo) = γtχt.
28The detailed steps can be found in the online appendix.
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We aim to prove that there exists γF ∈ (0, γo) such that the IVP has a (unique) solution
which satisfies γT = γ
o. (γF = 0 cannot work, as (β0, β1, β3, γ) = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0) is the
unique solution.) As argued in the proof of Proposition 1, it suffices to show that the system
is uniformly bounded if γt ∈ [0, γo] over [0, T ] (see the proof of Theorem 1 for further details).
The α-ODE is α˙t = f
α(t, αt) := rαt[1 − αt(2 − χt)] and α0 = 12−χ0 > 0. By the
comparison theorem, α > 0; hence, by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma A.1, γ
is increasing (in the backward system), so χ = 1 − γ/γo < 1 is decreasing. As α0 = 12−χ0
and α˙0 >
d
dt
(
1
2−χt
)
|t=0, the comparison theorem can be applied to α and 1/(2− χ) to show
αt ≥ 1/(2 − χt) ≥ 1/2, with both inequalities strict for all t ∈ (0, T ], for all r ≥ 0; in turn,
α˙t ≤ 0 (and hence α˙t ≥ 0 in the forward system) for all t ∈ [0, T ], with strict inequality for
t ∈ (0, T ] if and only if r > 0. It follows that for all t ∈ (0, T ], αt ≤ α0 = 12−χ0 < 1.
Now, BNF := β0 + β1 + β3 satisfies B˙
NF
t =
αt
2σ2Y
{
2rσ2Y (2− χt)[1−BNFt ]
}
with BNF0 = 1;
thus BNF ≡ 1. By routine application of the comparison theorem to the backward system,
β3 ∈ (1/2, 1) and β1 ∈ (0, 1), from which β0 is bounded too; thus, a solution to the BVP for
(β0, β1, β3, γ) exists, as discussed in the proof of Proposition 1. In the online appendix we
check that the rest of the coefficients are well defined, ensuring the existence of an LME.
The final claim is αT → 1 as T → ∞ in the forward system. Indeed, since α > 1/2, we
have γT → 0 as T →∞; thus χT → 1 and αT = 1/(2− χT )→ 1, all in forward form.
For the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4, see the online appendix.
Appendix B: Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. We consider a drift of the form aˆt + νat, ν ∈ [0, 1], in X. Also, let
L in (10) denote a process that is measurable with respect to X. Inserting (10) into (8)
yields at = α0t + α2tLt + α3tθ which the myopic player thinks drives Y , where α0t = β0t,
α2t = β2t+β1t(1−χt), and α3t = β3t+β1tχt (the latter often abbreviated αt in this appendix).
The myopic player’s filtering problem is then conditionally Gaussian. Specifically, define
dXˆt := dXt − [aˆt + ν(α0t + α2tLt)]dt = να3tθdt+ σXdZXt
dYˆt := dYt − [α0t + α2tLt]dt = α3tθdt+ σY dZYt ,
which are in the myopic player’s information set, and where the last equalities hold from his
perspective. By Theorems 12.6 and 12.7 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1977), his posterior belief
is Gaussian with mean Mˆt and variance γ1t (simply γt in the main body) that evolve as
dMˆt =
να3tγ1t
σ2X
[dXˆt − να3tMˆtdt] + α3tγ1t
σ2Y
[dYˆt − α3tMˆtdt] and ˙γ1t = −γ21tα23tΣ, (B.1)
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with Σ := ν2/σ2X+1/σ
2
Y . (These expressions still hold after deviations, which go undetected.)
The long-run player can affect Mˆt via her choice of actions. Indeed, using that dXˆ =
ν(at−α0t−α2tLt)dt+ σXdZXt and dYˆt = (at−α0t−α2tLt)dt+ σY dZYt from her standpoint,
dMˆt = (κ0t + κ1tat + κ2tMˆt)dt+B
X
t dZ
X
t +B
Y
t dZ
Y
t , where (B.2)
κ1t = α3tγ1tΣ, κ0t = −κ1t[α0t + α2tLt], κ2t = −α3tκ1t, BXt =
να3tγ1t
σX
, BYt =
α3tγ1t
σY
. (B.3)
On the other hand, since the long-run player always thinks that the myopic player is
on path, the public signal evolves, from her perspective, as dXt = (νat + δ0t + δ1tMˆtdt +
δ2tLt)dt+σXdZ
X
t . Because the dynamics of Mˆ and X have drifts that are affine in Mˆ—with
intercepts and slopes that are in the long-run player’s information set—and deterministic
volatilities, the pair (Mˆ,X) is conditionally Gaussian. Thus, by the filtering equations in
Theorem 12.7 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1977), Mt := Et[Mˆt] and γ2t := Et[(Mt−Mˆt)2] satisfy
dMt = (κ0t + κ1tat + κ2tMt)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Et[(κ0t+κ1tat+κ2tMˆt)dt]
+
σXB
X
t + γ2tδ1t
σ2X
[dXt − (νat + δ0t + δ1tMt + δ2tLt)dt] (B.4)
γ˙2t = 2κ2tγ2t + (B
X
t )
2 + (BYt )
2 − (BXt + γ2tδ1t/σX)2 , (B.5)
with dZt := [dXt − (νat + δ0t + δ1tMt + δ2tLt)dt]/σX a Brownian motion from the long-run
player’s standpoint.29 Critically, observe that since (B.4) is linear, one can solve for Mt as an
explicit function of past actions (as)s<t and past realizations of the public history (Xs)s<t.
Inserting at = β0t+β1tMt+β2tLt+β3tθ in (B.4) and collecting terms yields dMt = [κˆ0t+
κˆ1tMt+κˆ2tLt+κˆ3tθ]dt+BˆtdXt, where, (i) κˆ0t = −α3tγ1tα0tΣ+α3tγ1tβ0tΣ+να3tγ1t+γ2tδ1tσ2X [−νβ0t−
δ0t], (ii) κˆ1t = α3tγ1tβ1tΣ − α23tγ1tΣ + να3tγ1t+γ2tδ1tσ2X [−νβ1t − δ1t], (iii) κˆ2t = −α3tγ1tα2tΣ +
α3tγ1tβ2tΣ+
να3tγ1t+γ2tδ1t
σ2X
[−νβ2t−δ2t], (iv) κˆ3t =
[
α3tγ1t
σ2Y
− νγ2tδ1t
σ2X
]
β3t and (v) Bˆt =
να3tγ1t+γ2tδ1t
σ2X
.
Let R(t, s) = exp(
´ t
s
κˆ1udu). Since M0 = µ, we have Mt = R(t, 0)µ + θ
´ t
0
R(t, s)κˆ3sds +´ t
0
R(t, s)[κˆ0s + κˆ2sLs]ds+
´ t
0
R(t, s)BˆsdXs. Imposing equality with (10) yields the equations
χt =
´ t
0
R(t, s)κˆ3sds and Lt = [R(t, 0)µ+
´ t
0
R(t, s)[κˆ0s+ κˆ2sLs]ds+
´ t
0
R(t, s)BˆsdXs]/[1−χt].
The validity of the construction boils down to finding a solution to the previously stated
equation for χ that takes values in [0, 1). Indeed, when this is the case, it is easy to see that
dLt = {Lt[κˆ1t + κˆ2t + κˆ3t]dt+ κˆ0tdt+ BˆtdXt}/(1− χt), (B.6)
29Theorem 12.7 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1977) is stated for actions that depend on (θ,X) exclusively, but
it also applies to those that condition on past play (i.e., on M). Indeed, from (B.2), Mˆt = Mˆ
†
t + At where
M†t = M
†
t [Z
X
s , Z
Y
t ; s < t] and At =
´ t
0
e
´ s
0
κ2uduκ1sasds. Applying the theorem to (Mˆ
†
t , Xt−
´ t
0
νasds)t∈[0,T ],
yields a posterior mean M†t and variance γ
†
2t for Mˆ
† such that M† +At = Mt as in (B.4) and γ2t = γ
†
2t.
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from which it is easy to conclude that L is a (linear) function of X as conjectured.
We will find a solution to the χ-equation that is C1 with values in [0, 1). Differentiating
χt =
´ t
0
R(t, s)κˆ3sds then yields an ODE for χ as below that is coupled with γ1 and γ2:
γ˙1t = −γ21t(β3t + β1tχt)2Σ
γ˙2t = −2γ2tγ1t(β3t + β1tχt)2Σ + γ21t(β3t + β1tχt)2Σ− (νγ1t(β3t + β1tχt) + γ2tδ1t)2 /σ2X
χ˙t = γ1t(β3t + β1tχt)
2Σ(1− χt)− (ν[β3t + β1tχt] + δ1tχt) (νγ1t(β3t + β1tχt) + γ2tδ1t) /σ2X .
In the proof of Lemma 2 we establish that χ = γ2/γ1 ∈ [0, 1) taking the system above as a
primitive (we do it for ν = 0, but it also holds otherwise). Setting ν = 0 and γ2 = χγ1 in the
third ODE, and writing γ for γ1, the first and third ODEs become (12)–(13). If now ν = 0,
using (i)–(v) that define (~ˆκ, Bˆ) yields that (B.6) becomes dLt = (`0t+`1tLt)dt+BtdXt where
(l0t, l1t, Bt) = [σ
2
X(1− χt)]−1 × (−γtχtδ0tδ1t,−γtχtδ1t(δ1t + δ2t), γtχtδ1t). (B.7)
That Lt coincides with E[θ|FXt ] is proved in the Online Appendix. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the system in (γ1, γ2, χ) from the proof of the previous
lemma when ν = 0, and let δ1t := uˆaˆθ + uˆaaˆα3t.
30 The local existence of a solution fol-
lows from Peano’s Theorem. Suppose that the maximal interval of existence is [0, T˜ ), with
T˜ ≤ T . Since the system is locally Lipschitz continuous in (γ1, γ2, χ) uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ],
its solution over [0, T˜ ) is unique (Picard-Lindelo¨f). Applying the comparison theorem to
the pairs {γ1, 0} and {γ1, γo}, we get γ1t ∈ (0, γo] over [0, T˜ ). Hence, γ2/γ1 is well-defined,
and since it solves the χ-ODE, χ = γ2/γ1 by uniqueness. Replacing γ2 = χγ1 and ν = 0
in the χ−ODE then yields (13). A second application of the comparison theorem to {χ, 0}
and {χ, 1} then implies χ ∈ [0, 1), and in turn γ2 = χγ1 ∈ [0, γo), over [0, T˜ ). Since the
solution is bounded, if T˜ < T , it can be extended to T˜ by the continuity of the RHS of the
system; and then subsequently extended beyond T˜ by Peano’s theorem, a contradiction. But
if T˜ = T , it can be extended to T—the first part of the lemma holds. If β30 6= 0, then γ˙10 < 0
and χ˙0 > 0, so by continuity of γ˙1 and χ˙, there exists  > 0 such that γ1t < γ
o and χt > 0
for all t ∈ (0, ), and by the comparison theorem, these strict inequalities hold up to time T .
Proof of Lemma 3. Inserting ν = 0 in (B.3) defining (κ0, κ1, κ2, B
X
t ) yields that (B.4)
becomes dMt =
γtα3t
σ2Y
(at − [α0t + α2tLt + α3tMt])dt + χtγtδ1tσX dZt, where dZt := [dXt − (νat +
δ0t + δ1tMt + δ2tLt)dt]/σX a Brownian motion from the long-run player’s standpoint. As for
30All the results in this proof extend (i) to ν ∈ [0, 1] and (ii) to δ1 a generic continuous function over
[0, T ], the latter case arising when the myopic player becomes forward looking.
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the law of motion of L, this one follows from (14) using (B.7) and that dXt = (δ0t + δ2tLt +
δ1tMt)dt+ σXdZt from the long-run player’s perspective when ν = 0.
We conclude with three observations. First, from (B.2) and (B.4), Mˆt−Mt is independent
of the strategy followed, and hence so is Zt due to σXdZt = δ1t(Mˆt −Mt)dt+ σXdZXt under
the true data-generating process. This strategic independence enables us to fix an exogenous
Brownian motion Z and then solve the best-response problem with Z in the laws of motion
of M and L—i.e., the so-called separation principle for control problems with unobserved
states applies (see, for instance, Liptser and Shiryaev, 1977, Chapter 16).
Second, it is clear from (18), (B.4)–(B.5), and the proof of Lemma 2 that no additional
state variables are needed due to γ2t := Et[(Mt − Mˆt)2] = χtγt holding irrespective of the
strategy chosen. Third, the set of admissible strategies for the best-response problem then
consists of all square-integrable processes that are progressively measurable with respect to
(θ,M,L). This set is clearly the appropriate set, and richer than that in Definition 1. 
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 2, the system of ODEs (12)-(13) admits a unique so-
lution. The proof then consists of showing that (γ, χ(γ)) as in the lemma, with c2 =
σ2X
2uˆ2aaˆ
[
√
1/σ2Y + 4(uaaˆ/[σXσY ]
2−1/σ2Y ] ∈ (0, 1), c1 = σ
2
X
2uˆ2aaˆ
[
√
1/σ2Y + 4(uaaˆ/[σXσY ]
2+1/σ2Y ] > 0
and d = [σY uˆaaˆ]
2(c1 + c2)/σ
2
X > 0, is a solution. This is done in the Online Appendix, where
we also show how to construct the candidate χ and the above coefficients. 
B.1: Proof of Theorem 1
In light of the generality of Theorem 2, we only sketch the proof of Theorem 1 here (all the
details are in the Online Appendix). Specifically, the proof can be divided into two steps:
reduction and shooting.31 In the reduction step, we show that the problem of solving the
BVP stated in Section 4.3 can be translated to finding a value γF such that the backward IVP
consisting of ODEs for (v8γ, β1, β3, γ) with γ0 = γ
F has a solution over [0, T ] that shoots γ to
γo at T ; this is done after recognizing that v6 and β2 can be written as functions of the other
variables in closed form. We then tackle the shooting step via a contradiction. Specifically,
we consider the supremum over values γ˜F such that all the IVPs with γ0 = γ
F ∈ [0, γ˜F )
admit a solution over [0, T ]—towards a contradiction, assume that γT < γ
o for all initial
conditions in the maximal set induced (otherwise, our desired conclusion follows from the
continuity of the solutions). Under this assumption, γt ∈ [0, γo] at all times, and one can
show that for some horizons as in the theorem, the solutions can be uniformly bounded over
all initial values in the maximal set. But this in turn implies that a solution to our IVP
31A final step of verification—i.e., checking that the rest of the coefficients are well defined as the last
step for finding a LME—is a special instance of “Step 5” in the proof of Theorem 2, and is thus omitted.
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defined over [0, T ] exists for initial values of γ strictly above the supremum, a contradiction.32
B.2: Proof of Theorem 2
After a change of variables β˜2 = β2/(1−χ), v˜6 = v6γ/(1−χ)2, v˜8 = v8γ/(1−χ), the BVP is
˙˜v6t = γt
{
−β21t + 2β1tβ˜2t + β˜22t + v˜6t
[
α2t/σ
2
Y + 2(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)
2χt/σ
2
X
]}
(B.8)
˙˜v8t = γt
{
(−2 + 4αt)β1t − 2β˜2t + v˜8t(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2χt/σ2X − 4β21tχt
}
(B.9)
β˙1t = γt[4σ
2
Xσ
2
Y (1 + uˆaˆθχt)]
−1 × {2σ2Xαt ([uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt]2 − αt[uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt])
+4σ2Xαtβ1t(αt − β1t) + v˜8tαtχt(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2(uˆaˆθ − 2β1t)
+4β1tχt
[
uˆ2aˆθσ
2
Y + uˆaˆθαt
(
uˆaˆθσ
2
X + 2uˆaˆaσ
2
Y − σ2Xβ1t
)]
+4uˆaˆaβ1tα
2
tχt
(
2uˆaˆθσ
2
X + uˆaˆaσ
2
Y + σ
2
Xαt[uˆaˆa − 1]
)
−4σ2Y (uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2β˜2tχt + 4σ2Y (uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2β1t(uˆaˆθ − 2β˜2t)χ2t
}
(B.10)
˙˜β2t = γt[4σ
2
Xσ
2
Y (1 + uˆaˆθχt)]
−1 ×
{
2σ2Xαt
[
uˆ2aˆθ + 2β
2
1t + αt(uˆaˆθ[2uˆaˆa − 1] + 2β˜2t)
]
+2σ2Xα
3
t uˆaˆa(uˆaˆa − 1) + αtχt(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2
[
−4v˜6t + v˜8t(uˆaˆθ − 2β˜2t)
]
+4αtχtσˆ
2
X
[
uaˆθβ
2
1t + (uˆ
2
aˆθ + uˆaˆaαt[2uˆaˆθ + (uˆaˆa − 1)αt])β˜2t
]
−4(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2
[
uˆaˆθv˜6tαt + σ
2
Y β˜2t(−uˆaˆθ + 2β˜2t)
]
χ2t
}
(B.11)
β˙3t = γt[4σ
2
Xσ
2
Y (1 + uˆaˆθχt)]
−1 × {−4σ2Xα2tβ1t − χ2t [v˜8tαt(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2(uˆaˆθ − 2β1t)]
+2αtχt(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)
[−uˆaˆθσ2X + σ2Xαt (2uˆaˆθ + [uˆaˆa − 1](2αt − 1))]
−2α2tχv˜8t(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2 − 2αtχt[2uˆaˆθσ2Xαtβ1t − 2σ2Xβ21t]
−4σ2Xχ2tαtβ1t[uˆaˆθαt(2uˆaˆa − 1) + uˆaˆaα2t (uˆaˆa − 1) + uˆaˆθ(uˆaˆθ − β1t)]
−4σ2Y χ2t (uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2(−1 + 2αt)β˜2t + 8σ2Y (uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2β1tβ˜2tχ3t
}
(B.12)
γ˙t = −α2tγ2t /σ2Y (B.13)
χ˙t = γt
{
α2t (1− χt)/σ2Y − (uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)2χ2t/σ2X
}
. (B.14)
with boundaries (γ0, χ0, v˜6T , v˜8T , β1T , β˜2T , β3T ) = (γ
o, 0, 0, 0, uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ
2(2−uˆaˆaχT ) ,
uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ
2(2−uˆaˆaχT ) , 1/2) and
where α := β3 + β1χ. (By Lemma 2 and Assumption 1 part (ii) (using uaθ = uaaˆ = 1/2) the
denominators are strictly positive, and hence well defined after all possible histories.)
The proof proceeds in five steps. The main task is to obtain a solution (v˜6, v˜8, β1, β˜2, β3, γ, χ)
to the boundary value problem for all T < T (γo); from there, it is straightforward to verify
32See Bonatti et al. (2017) for an application of this method to a symmetric oligopoly model featuring
dispersed fixed private information, imperfect public monitoring, and multiple long-run firms.
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that the remaining equilibrium coefficients are well defined, as we do at the end of the proof.
Step 1: Convert BVP to fixed point problem in terms of a parameterized IVP. It is useful
to introduce z = (v˜6, v˜8, β1, β˜2, β3, γ, χ)
T and write the system of ODEs (B.8)-(B.14) as
z˙t = F (zt). We write z˜ = (z1, z2, . . . , z5)
T and F˜ (z) = (F1(z), F2(z), . . . , F5(z))
T.
Define B : [0, 1)→ R5 by B(χ) =
(
0, 0, uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ
2(2−uˆaˆaχ) ,
(uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ)
2(2−uˆaˆaχ) , 1/2
)T
, formed by writing the
terminal value of z˜ as a function of χ. Define s0 ∈ R5 by s0 = B(0) = (0, 0, uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ4 , uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ4 , 1/2)T.
For x ∈ Rn, let ||x||∞ denote the sup norm, sup1≤i≤n |xi|. For any ρ > 0, let Sρ(s0) denote
the closed ρ-ball around s0, Sρ(s0) := {s ∈ R5| ||s− s0||∞ ≤ ρ}.
For all s ∈ Sρ(s0), let IVP-s denote the initial value problem defined by (B.8)-(B.14)
and initial conditions (v˜60, v˜80, β10, β˜20, β30, γ0, χ0) = (s, γ
o, 0). Whenever a solution to IVP-s
exists, it is unique as F is of class C1; denote it by z(s), where z(s) = (z˜(s)T, γ(s), χ(s))T =
(v˜6(s), v˜8(s), β1(s), β˜2(s), β3(s), γ(s), χ(s))
T, where we suppress additional dependence on
(γo, 0) which remain fixed. Note that such a solution solves the BVP if and only if
z˜T (s) = B(χT (s)), (B.15)
as the initial values γ0(s) = γ
o and χ0(s) = 0 are satisfied by construction. Note also that
z˜T (s) = s +
´ T
0
F˜ (zt(s)) dt; hence (B.15) is satisfied if and only if s is a fixed point of the
function g : Sρ(s0)→ R5 defined by g(s) := B(χT (s))−
´ T
0
F˜ (zt(s))dt. Note, moreover, that
for any solution, we have by Lemma 2 that χt ∈ [0, χ¯), where we define χ¯ := 1 for this proof.
Step 2: Obtain sufficient conditions for IVP-s to have unique and uniformly bounded so-
lutions for all s ∈ Sρ(s0), any ρ > 0. Specifically, for arbitrary K > 0, we ensure that the
solution z˜t(s) varies at most K from its starting point s for all t ∈ [0, T ], and thus by the
triangle inequality, this solution varies most ρ+K from s0. These bounds will be used later.
Lemma B.1. Fix γo, ρ,K > 0. There exists a threshold T SBC(γo; ρ,K) > 0 such that if
T < T SBC(γo; ρ,K), then for all s ∈ Sρ(s0) a unique solution to IVP-s exists over [0, T ] with
z˜t(s) ∈ Sρ+K(s0), all t ∈ [0, T ]. We call this property the System Bound Condition (SBC).
Proof. Fix any s ∈ Sρ(s0). Since F˜ is of class C1, a local solution exists, and solutions are
unique given existence. We now construct bounds on F˜ by writing F˜ (z(s)) = F˜ (z(s)−s0+s0)
and using the conjectured bounds ||z˜(s) − s0||∞ < ρ + K, γ ∈ (0, γo], χ ∈ [0, χ¯) for the
solution, when it exists. Using these bounds on F˜ , we identify T SBC(γo; ρ,K) such that for
all t < T SBC(γo; ρ,K) the solution to IVP-s (exists and) satisfies the conjectured bounds.
Note that the desired component-wise inequalities |zit(s)−si0| < ρ+K, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5},
imply the further bounds |v˜6t|, |v˜8t| < v¯6(ρ,K) := v¯8(ρ,K) := ρ+K, |β1t|, |β˜2t| < β¯1(ρ,K) :=
β¯2(ρ,K) :=
|uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ|
4
+ ρ + K, |β3t| < β¯3(ρ,K) := 1/2 + ρ + K and |αt| < α¯(ρ,K) :=
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β¯1(ρ,K)χ¯ + β¯3(ρ,K). A lower bound on 1 + uˆaˆθχt in the denominators of (B.10)-(B.12) is
u := min{1, 1 + uˆaˆθ}; using that uaθ = uaaˆ = 1/2, Assumption 1 part (ii) implies u > 0.
By the triangle inequality, one can use these bounds construct functions hi(γ
o; ρ,K),
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}, proportional to γo, which bound the magnitudes of the RHS in (B.8)-
(B.12). Now for arbitrary (ρ,K) ∈ R2++, define T SBC(γo; ρ,K) := mini∈{1,2,...,5} Khi(γo;ρ,K) .
We claim that, for any t < T SBC(γo; ρ,K), if a solution exists at time t, then ||z˜t(s) −
s||∞ < K, γt ∈ (0, γo] and χt ∈ [0, χ¯). To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that
there is some s ∈ Sρ and some t < T SBC(γo; ρ,K) at which a solution to IVP-s exists but
either |zit(s) − si| ≥ K for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}, γt /∈ (0, γo] or χt /∈ [0, χ¯); let τ be the
infimum of such times. Now by Lemma 2, it cannot be that γt /∈ (0, γo] or χt /∈ [0, χ¯) while
zt(s) exists, so (by continuity of zt(s) in t) it must be that for some i, |ziτ (s)−si| ≥ K, while
γt ∈ (0, γo] and χt ∈ [0, χ¯) hold for t ∈ [0, τ ]. By construction of hi(γo; ρ,K), for all t ∈ [0, τ ]
we have |Fi(zt(s))| ≤ hi(γo; ρ,K) and thus |ziτ (s)− si| ≤
´ τ
0
|Fi(zt(s))|dt ≤ τ · hi(γo; ρ,K) <
T SBC(γo; ρ,K)hi(γ
o; ρ,K) ≤ K; this is a contradiction, so the claim holds. By the triangle
inequality, z˜t(s) ∈ Sρ+K(s0) if a solution exists at time t < T SBC(γo; ρ,K). Hence, if
T < T SBC(γo; ρ,K), a (unique) solution to IVP-s exists over [0, T ], since an explosion at
any time would imply that the previous bound is violated at an earlier time.
Step 3: Establish that g is a well defined, continuous self-map on Sρ when T is below a
threshold T (γo; ρ,K). The expression for the latter is shown in the proof Lemma B.2 below.
Lemma B.2. Fix γo > 0, ρ > 0 and K > 0. There exists T (γo; ρ,K) ≤ T SBC(γo; ρ,K)
such that for all T < T (γo; ρ,K), g is a well defined, continuous self-map on Sρ.
Proof. First, the inequality T (γo; ρ,K) ≤ T SBC(γo; ρ,K), which holds by construction (as
carried out below), ensures that a unique solution to IVP-s exists for all s ∈ Sρ, and hence g
is well defined on Sρ. Now g(s) is equal to B(χT (s))− [z˜T (s)− s]. The continuity of g then
follows from z˜T and χT being continuous in s and B in χ.
To complete the proof, we show that if T < T (γo; ρ,K), g satisfies the condition ||g(s)−
s0||∞ ≤ ρ for all s ∈ Sρ, which we refer to as the Self-Map Condition (SMC).
Note that g(s) − s0 = ∆(s) −
´ T
0
F˜ (zt(s))dt, where ∆(s) := B(χT (s)) − B(0) takes the
value |uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ|
2
[(2− uˆaˆaχT (s))−1 − 1/2] in its third and fourth components and zero in the
others. The hi(γ
o; ρ,K) constructed in the proof of the previous lemma will provide us a
bound for the components of
´ T
0
F˜ (zt(s))dt, but we must also bound ∆3(s) = ∆4(s).
Recalling that χ ∈ [0, 1), the ODE for χ implies that χ˙t ≤ γt {α2t (1− χt)/σ2Y } ≤ γoα¯2/σ2Y .
We also have χT =
´ T
0
χ˙tdt ≤ (γoα¯2/σ2Y )T . Next, observe that 2 − uˆaˆaχT (s) ≥ φ :=
min{2, 2 − uˆaˆa} > 0, where strict inequality follows from Assumption 1 part (iv) using
uaaˆ = 1/2. Hence, |∆3(s)| = |uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ|2
∣∣∣ uˆaˆaχT (s)2(2−uˆaˆaχT (s)) ∣∣∣ ≤ |uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ|4 |uˆaˆa|(γoα¯2/σ2Y )Tφ .
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Define ∆¯i : R3++ → R+ by ∆i(γo; ρ,K) = |uˆaˆa+2uˆaˆθ|4
|uˆaˆa|γoα¯2/σ2Y
φ
for i ∈ {3, 4} and
∆¯i(γ
o; ρ,K) = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2, 5}. Note that for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, ∆¯i(γo; ρ,K) is pro-
portional to γo, and by construction, |∆i(s)| ≤ T ∆¯i(γo; ρ,K). Finally, define
T (γo; ρ,K) := min
{
T SBC(γo; ρ,K), min
i∈{1,2,...,5}
ρ
∆¯i(γo; ρ,K) + hi(γo; ρ,K)
}
. (B.16)
We now have |gi(s)−si0| = |∆i(s)−
´ T
0
Fi(zt(s))dt| bounded above by |∆i(s)|+
´ T
0
|Fi(zt(s))|dt ≤
T ∆¯i(γ
o; ρ,K)+Thi(γ
o; ρ,K) < ρ, where we have used that T < T (γo; ρ,K) ≤ ρ
∆¯i(γo;ρ,K)+hi(γo;ρ,K)
by construction. Hence, |gi(s)− si0| ≤ ρ for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}, completing the proof.
Step 4: Apply a fixed point theorem to g to find s such that the solution to IVP-s solves
the BVP. By Lemma B.2, we can apply Brouwer’s Theorem: there exists s∗ ∈ Sρ such that
s∗ = g(s∗), and hence the solution to IVP-s∗ is a solution to the BVP. That T (γo) ∈ O(1/γo)
follows simply from the denominators of the underlying expressions begin proportional to
γo. One can further optimize T (γo; ρ,K) over (ρ,K) ∈ R2++ to obtain T (γo).
Step 5: Show that given a solution to the BVP as above, the remaining coefficients are well
defined and thus a LME exists. Since γ > 0 and χ < 1 over [0, T ] in our solution, the tuple
(v6, v8, β1, β2, β3, γ, χ) (obtained by reversing the change of variables at the beginning of the
proof) solves our original boundary value problem by construction.
To verify that the remaining coefficients are well defined, consider first the ODE for α:
α˙t =
αt(uˆaˆθ+uˆaˆaαt)γtχt
2σ2Xσ
2
Y (1+uˆaˆθχt)
{
(uˆaˆθ + uˆaˆaαt)[2σ
2
Xαt − v˜8tαt − 4σ2Y β˜2tχt]− 2σ2Xα2t
}
. By continuity of
the solution to the BVP, the RHS of the equation above is locally Lipschitz continuous in
α, uniformly in t. Moreover, αT = β1TχT + β3T =
1+uˆaˆθχT
2−uˆaˆaχT > 0 by Assumption 1 parts (ii)
and (iv) given uaθ = uaaˆ = 1/2. By the comparison theorem, αt > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Using the solution to the BVP and the inequalities above, we identify the remaining
equilibrium coefficients. We have directly v2t =
2σ2Y β0t
γtαt
, v5t =
σ2Y [β1t(2−χt)−β3t−uˆaˆθ]
γtαt
, v7t =
−2σ2Y (1−2β3t)
γtαt
and v9t =
2σ2Y [β2t−β1t(1−χt)]
γtαt
. The last three are well defined as α, γ > 0. In the
remaining ODEs—included in the online appendix—(β0, v1, v3) is uncoupled from (v0, v4).
By inspection, the former has (unique) solution (β0, v1, v3) = (0, 0, 0). Hence v2 = 0, and the
solutions for (v0, v4) can be obtained directly by integration, given their terminal values. 
B.3: Existence Proof Sketch for the General Model
In what follows, we refer the reader to the Mathematica file spm.nb on our websites. There,
we work under the normalization ∂2U/∂a2 = ∂2Uˆ/∂aˆ2 = −1, as scaling flow payoffs by a
factor does not affect incentives; consequently, Uxy = uxy, for x, y ∈ {a, aˆ, θ} in that file.
As in the paper, we first show that the task of finding LMEs can be reduced to a BVP
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in (v6, v8, ~β, γ, χ). In this BVP, Assumption 1 and the fact that χ ∈ [0, 1) ensure that the
terminal conditions ((1− uaaˆuˆaaˆ) and (1− uaaˆuˆaaˆχT ) in their denominators), as well as the
ODEs (with (uaθ + uaaˆuˆaˆθχt) and (1 − uaaˆuˆaaˆ) in their denominators) are all well defined.
The change of variables (v˜6, v˜8, β˜2) = (
v6γ
(1−χ)2 ,
v8γ
1−χ ,
β2
1−χ) takes us to a new well defined BVP
consisting of (v˜6, v˜8, β1, β˜2, β3, γ, χ), where (1− χt) is absent from their denominators.
The existence proof for the latter BVP now follows the same Steps 1–4 as in the proof of
Theorem 2. Regarding Step 5: 1) 1 − χ > 0 and γ > 0 allow us to recover (v6, v8, β2) from
(v˜6, v˜8, β˜2); 2) αT 6= 0 and the comparison theorem applied to α and 0 (in backward form)
yield α 6= 0, so (v2, v5, v7, v9) are well defined; 3) (β0, v3) form a linear system in themselves
that does not contain v0, v1 or v4, so its solution exists and is unique; 4) the ODEs for v0, v1
and v4 are linear in themselves and uncoupled, so they have unique solutions.
Proofs for Section 5: Refer to the online appendix.
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